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Glossary: 
 
 
 
The following lists a number of words that are used in Dari language for the two houses 
of the national assembly as well as for parties. 
 
 
 
Meshrano Jirga -  Upper House of the National Assembly 
 
Wolesi Jirga -  Lower House of the National Assembly 
 
Hezb-e -  Party 
 
Jamiat -  Association 
 
Harakat -  Movement 
 
Mahaz -  Front 
 
 VII 
Millat -  Nation 
 
Junbesh -  Movement 
 
Milli -   National 
 
Wahdat -  Unity 
 
Mardum -  People 
 
Mujahedeen - Guerrilla fighters (Or those, who were fighting against Soviet 
Union invasion)  
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1. Introduction 
 
This dissertation has undertaken a case study of presidential system in divided society of 
Afghanistan. Generally, the study aimed at explaining how a combination of 
presidentialism and a society deeply divided along ethno-religious lines, go together, and 
what sorts of problems as well as challenges existed a head of stability of presidential 
government in such society. In fact, the Afghanistan’s first democratically elected 
presidential government offers a suitable case for studying presidentialim in a divided 
society. With its three decades experiences in war, instability, and ethnic as well as 
religious tensions, Afghanistan’s new constitution in 2004 adopted presidential system 
for the country’s future political system. However, such a system due to some reasons 
was not recommendable for a country like Afghanistan1. It is because the “winner-take-
all” characteristic of presidentialism can be problematic for the country where multiple 
ethnic groups are competing for power. In such situation, since the presidency is the only 
prize worth winning, the risk of going back to an ethnic war will become high. As it was 
the case of Angola; in 1991 the minority candidate, Jonas Savimbi, after loosing the 
election, he immediately restarted the war. Also, there is the possibility that 
presidentialism in divided societies may create divided government with executive under 
                                                
1 - See Andrew Reynolds. 2007:3.  
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the control of one ethnic group and legislature under the control of another ethnic group. 
In such a situation, the probability of executive-legislative conflict as well as institutional 
paralysis will become high which might lead to the government breakdown. Despite the 
challenges which a presidential government might encounter in a divided society, the 
Afghanistan’s case of presidential government has shown quiet a different result so far. It 
is first presidential government (2004-2009) survived without facing any serious 
executive-legislative conflict which could cause institutional paralysis and breakdown. 
Furthermore, the country has already experienced its second presidential election and has 
established a new government.    
 
 Therefore, this study has tried to explain how the Afghanistan’s presidential government 
has survived during its first and politically most unstable period. The study was based 
primarily upon the analysis of the relation between executive and legislative branches of 
government with a main focus on reasons, how President Hamid Karzai could gain 
legislators’ support as well as avoiding any serious confrontation with the assembly.      
 
This first chapter of the dissertation has presented the background of the study, specified 
the problem of the study, described its significance, and presented an overview of the 
methodology used. The chapter concluded by noting delimitation of the study.  
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1.1. The Background of the Study       
 
It might be useful at this juncture to give a brief description on the recent political 
development occurring in Afghanistan, at the time that influenced the study. The study 
was conducted at a time when Afghanistan was putting further steps toward its political 
developments process, started in 2001, as it was preparing for the second presidential 
election in it is political history. In this section, firs, a general overview of Afghanistan’s 
process of political development have been undertaken, and then the debates on the 
introduction presidential system to Afghanistan have been reviewed.   
 
General Overview of Afghanistan’s process of political development: 
 
During the years of President Najibullah’s regime (1987-1991)2, Afghanistan ruled by 
one party domination system3. Although, the President Najibullah’s government was 
consist of a bicameral national assembly but it was not a fully representative assembly. 
The election for the establishment of national assembly was held only in Kabul city and 
MPs were elected only from the Kabul city. Therefore, since the country ruled by one 
part which was the president party, there was no actual separation of power between 
executive and legislative branch. In fact, the legislature had symbolic role and fully under 
                                                
2 - President Najibullah was the last president of the pro-Soviet Union Afghan state called Democratic 
republic of Afghanistan.. During that time Afghanistan had one party ruling system. 
3 - The only party which was also ruling the country was the Parcham, which later changed its name to the 
Watan (homeland), a pro-Soviet Union party. The leader of the party was the country’s president, who 
elected for presidency through the election within the party itself. 
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the influence of president. Later, after the collapse President Najibullah’s regime at the 
end of 1991, and during the Mujahedeen (Islamic fighters who fought against Soviet 
Union occupation of Afghanistan) government (1991-1996), and the Taliban regime 
(1996-2001), Afghanistan did not have a legislature body. During the former regime, 
Afghanistan was, actually, divided to several mini-states, each controlled by one ethno-
political group which was fighting each others. There were no actual functioning central 
state institutions. During the later regime, though most parts of the country were 
controlled by one group however still there was no state institutions in the modern sense, 
and the country’s political system was best characterized by a feudal system.  
  
In fact, the following 9/11(Al-Qaeda attack on world trade center) and consequently 
overthrew of Taliban regime by US backed Northern-alliances 4  and international 
coalition forces, UN supervised Bonn conference (or meeting) in 2001, has laid the base 
for a new process of political development in Afghanistan. The process was consisting of 
two interrelated projects of democratization and state-building or re-establishment of 
permanent government institutions.  
  
In the political arena Afghanistan did, to some extent, succeed establishing a central 
state’s institutions and authorities that could brought, almost most of its ethnic, religious 
and politically fragmented groups together, at least majority of those who involved in 
civil war. In 2001, the major ethnically mobilized military groups who used to fight each 
other during the civil war (1992-96) came to agree, at the Bonn conference 5th December 
                                                
4 - The Northern Alliance, also called the United Front, established in 1996 by the groups opposed to the 
Taliban. It was a coalition of, mostly, none Pashtun groups ( Jamiat-e-Islami, Wahdate Islami, and Junbesh-
e-Milli Islami) in the north of Afghanistan [ Chris Johnson and others. 2003:3]. 
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2001, on a power-sharing based Interim and subsequent Transitional authorities. Then 
according to the political road map that laid out in the Bonn conference, the Interim 
authority set up to rule Afghanistan for 6 months with a major task of preparing the 
ground for the convention of an emergency Loya Jirga (Traditional grand council) to 
elect a Transitional authority. Thus, a Transitional authorities or government was decided 
by the Emergency Loya Jirga to lead Afghanistan until such time as a fully representative 
government can be elected through free and fair elections to be held no later than two 
years from the date of the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga. Within its 18 months 
period, scheduled by the Bonn conference, Transitional government had to facilitate the 
drafting and ultimately, establishment of a new Afghan constitution. Henceforth, 
Transitional authority with the help of United Nation (particularly United Nations 
Assistance Mission, UNAMA and United Nation Development Program) could get the 
task done by convening a Constitutional Loya Jirga to first; deliberate on and then ratify 
the new constitution [Johnson. 2006:9]. After the establishment of the new constitution in 
2004, Afghanistan entered into a new era of its political development process.             
 
 
With the establishment of a new democratic constitution in 2004 a new chapter has been 
opened and signed a turning point in political history of Afghanistan. The country for the 
first time could have a national document that all of its ethnic and religious groups agreed 
on, at least on its major part. The new constitution was adopted in 4th January 2004 
introduced democratic principles as the only norms regulating the future political game in 
Afghanistan as it was reflected in two consequent elections [ Afghanistan constitution, 
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Article 61-62- 83]. In 2004 presidential as well as in 2005 parliamentary and provincial 
council elections, Afghans for the first time could elect their head of government and 
members of parliament in the peaceful way, using the ballot card rather than opting for 
military ways. This in fact was a great achievement in the post-Taliban process of 
political transition for Afghans, having a new democratic constitution as well as 
democratically elected government and parliament in such short time after the collapse of 
Taliban regime in 2001. 
 
Debates on the Introduction of Presidential system in Afghanistan: 
 
 However, despite the rapid progress and achievements that Afghanistan had through its 
state-building project, establishing broad-based democratic political institutions, 
conducting, partially, free and fair elections; there appeared to be some concerns about 
future democratic stability and regime survival among academia as well as Afghan 
politicians5. Such a concern first was raised, when the 2004 constitution authorized a 
strong Presidential system with a fully centralized power structure for Afghanistan in 
which the President served as both head of state and head of government. The President 
who must be elected by a majority of the popular vote is eligible to sever two 5-year 
times [Afghan Constitution. 2004, article 61-62].  Both, a pure presidential form of 
government and a centralized power structure were not favored by some politicians 
representing the major political groups (Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek) at the commission for 
                                                
5 - See  Maley [2005] and Johnson [2006]. 
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drafting the new constitution6. And hence, there was a proposal sponsored by the 
Northern Alliance group opposing a pure presidential form of government and was 
calling for the establishment of a prime minister as a check on the presidency [Johnson 
2006:9]. Also, there was some call for federalism by representatives of some ethnic 
minorities, such as Uzbeks, opposing fully centralized power structure7.  
 
 Though, both proposals were rejected at the time of constitution making process (2004) 
but, such demands have continued to exist a cross different political community today. 
Several presidential candidates for the second Afghan presidential government in 2009, 
most notable among them Hamid Karzai’s main rival candidate Dr. Abdullah, has been 
proposing a constitutional amendment (shifting from Presidential to the Parliamentary 
type of government) in case of wining the election and becoming the next president8.  
  
Opposing a pure presidential form of government with a fully centralized power structure, 
they believed that, such a form of government would not guarantee ethnic stability and 
ethnic coexistence in fragmented society of Afghanistan. Rather it will encourage ethnic 
tensions and ethnic based politics in the country. As, in a pure presidential system 
political power will be rested only on the hand of  president, who is belong to one ethnic 
group thus, there is a risk  that political power will be abused in favor of one ethnic group.  
                                                
6 - According to the definition of  Stepan & Skach: A pure presidential regime in a democracy is a system 
of mutual independence: 1- the legislative power has a fixed electoral mandate that is its own sources of 
legitimacy. 2- The chief executive power has a fixed electoral mandated that is its own source of legitimacy 
[Stepan and Skach.1993:4]. Therefore, based on Stepan and Skach definition, the Afghanistan government 
can be characterized as pure presidential system. 
7 - It was stated by Mr. Nader Nadery( one of the representatives in Bonn conference as well as high 
commissioner of Afghanistan’s Independent committee) during author’s interview in Kabul, 6th of 
September 2009.  
8 - Dr. Abdullah’s interview with, TOLO TV, 2009/ 8/20. 
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Also, it has been argued by some authors such as Maley [2005], who closely observing 
Afghanistan’s recent political development process, that a strong presidential system can 
be a recipe for disaster in countries where political elites are deeply divided. It is because; 
a pure presidential system effectively permits only one winner, while potentially 
generating many disgruntled losers, therefore, the recommendation for Afghanistan was 
avoidance of a pure presidential system [Maley. 2005: 3]. In his analysis of 2004 
presidential as well as 2005 parliamentary elections, Thomas H. Johnson [2006] has came 
up with the same concern as some of Afghan politician had, the persistence of traditional 
ethnicity at the forefront of Afghan politics under the pure presidential system. His 
correlation analysis of the gathered data on the 2004 presidential election has represented 
that none of the Afghan candidates for the presidency could received significant support 
outside of their particular ethno-linguistic group. It means that Afghan ethnic groups 
tended to vote along ethnic lines rather than crossover to candidates from other ethnicities. 
Hamid Karzai could get elected by the majority’s vote, but majority of vote from his own 
ethnic group, Pashtuns, not other groups such as Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek and so on. What 
this analysis suggests is that Afghanistan faces an extremely difficult challenge of 
unifying a fragmented society and fostering the development of a national identity 
because each ethnic group is attempting to gain a foothold in government often at the 
expense of other groups. This in fact, fades away the prospects for uniting the divided 
country behind a single candidate [Johnson. 2006: 14].  
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 Nevertheless, despite the concerns about the future political stability which was 
increased after presidential election took place, there was some expectation that the 2005 
parliamentary election would produce a powerful and effective parliament, which can be 
check on the presidency and would not let the political power to be abused by the 
president. Moreover, it was expected to become a place where all ethnic and religious 
groups can exercise their political rights equally [Asia Report.2006:6]. It also expected 
that “this election would establish political blocs that eventually become actual political 
parties…” [Johnson.2006:15]. But, against such expectations, the election did not yield 
the result that was expected.  
 
Due to the rules and structure that was adopted for such election, ethnic, religious and 
regional interests appeared to become again the main incentives for the voters than a 
political ideology and program to cast their votes[Johnson.2006: 13]. On 25 May 2004, 
President Karzai signed election law that governed the 2005 parliamentary election. The 
law put a ban on the formal participation of political parties and forced the voters to vote 
for individual candidates rather than voting for party slates, proportional representation. 
Thus, the use of single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system and lack of political parties’ 
formal participation caused the new national assembly to be fragmented and deeply 
polarized on ethno-linguistic and religious line9. 
 
 However, despite the emergence of a fragmented national assembly and the absence of 
formal role for political party, essential for mediating probable tensions between 
executive and legislative branches the case of Afghanistan presidential government has 
                                                
9 - There were representatives from around 20 political parties and 10 ethnic groups.   
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presented, theoretically, quite unexpected result in its first and politically most unstable 
period. Despite some serious institutional and structural defects, the first Afghan 
presidential government (2004-2009) could survive without any serious political 
deadlocks in the relation with its ethno-linguistically fragmented national assembly. 
 
 In fact, the survival of Afghanistan’s first presidential government has offered an 
interesting case for studying presidential system in divided society. Therefore, this study 
has undertaken an attempt to analyze, how this first Afghan presidential government had 
survived. 
  
1.2. The Problem Statement 
 
Presidnetialism has been in general characterized by the conflict between executive and 
legislative branches, a conflict which believed to stem from the principle of separation of 
power between these two bodies. The experiences of some presidential regimes in Latin 
America shows that the conflict between executive and legislative can go as serious as it 
can cause institutional paralysis following by regime breakdown. The  unsuccessful cases 
of presidential democracies showing that conflict between executive and legislative is 
inevitable when the president party is not in a majority position, in turn; the opposition 
group controls the legislature. Also it showing that majority of those cases experienced 
failure had a highly fragmented party system. Therefore, scholars such as Jauan Linz, 
have called attention to the risk of institutional paralysis, which he argues originate from 
the principle of division of powers and fixed electoral calendars. These factors, therefore, 
 11 
are inherent in the institutional structure of presidentialism. The principle of division of 
powers, which originates from the independent election of the executive and the 
legislative branches, generates autonomous powers armed with mutual vetoes [Jauan. 
Linz.1990.p.53] In fact, the autonomous powers of two branches make the ground for the 
conflict, when the president can not get the support of an absolute majority in the 
assembly. 
 
However, this argument leads to the important questions about Afghanistan’s first 
democratically elected presidential government 2004-2009, which contained the seeds 
propitious for generating executive-legislative conflict and institutional paralysis. On the 
one hand, president Karzai faced a divided government by opposition figure leading the 
assembly. On the other hand, he did not have his own political party to support him in the 
legislature. But, nevertheless his government did not experience any serious political 
deadlock during its first presidential government. 
 
Thus, this dissertation aims to analysis Afghanistan’s case of first presidential 
government; with a main focusing point on illustrating what was the tactics of the first 
term of presidency reaching to its end without facing any serious political deadlock 
which otherwise, could cause its breakdown. To this end, the dissertation has been 
organized around following central questions: 
 
1- Why President Karzai was able to avoid serious confrontation with the legislature led 
by his opposition figure Yonus Qanoni? 
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2- Why could President Karzai gain legislator’s support in legislature housing none of his 
co-partisan? 
 
1.3. The Professional Significance of the Study 
 
It is likely that the following significances can be drawn form this study: First, Unlike, 
the previous studies on presidentialism10, which were based on the analysis of this system 
in the at least partially homogenous societies of Latin America, this study has dealt with 
the analysis of presidentialism in a deeply ethno-linguistically fragmented society out of 
the Latin American region. Hence, this study contributes to the broader understanding of 
presidentialism, through examining this system in the ethno-linguistically fragmented 
society of Afghanistan. 
 Second, also the previous studies on the presidentialism, mostly have focused on the 
analysis of the causes of executive-legislative conflict, institutional paralysis, and the 
breakdown of a presidential system. However, this study rather offers an analysis of how 
a presidential government has survived without facing any of those problems which are 
believed to be associated with presidentialism.  
 
Third, , through the analysis of Afghanistan’s case of presidential system, the study 
offered a detailed explanation of how a presidential system survived in a divided society 
without facing those problems associated with presidentialism. In this regard, the study 
                                                
10 - With the exception of those studies that concentrated on the case of the United States. 
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challenges Linz’s [1990] hypothesis that the separation of power and a fixed electoral 
calendar, which are characteristics of presidentialism, generate executive-legislative 
conflict and institutional paralysis. On the other hand, it contributes to the further 
confirmation of Shugart and Mainwaring’s [1997] hypothesis that presidential regimes 
are not always associated with instability and executive-legislative conflict; rather, based 
on the party system and the president’s constitutional as well as partisan powers, the 
functioning as well as performance of presidential regimes varies. Obviously, the case of 
Afghanistan’s first presidential government proved the existence of such a variation in 
the functioning of presidential systems. Despite a strong potential for conflict between 
the executive and legislative as well as institutional paralysis within the President Hamid 
Karzai government, his government survived facing none of these problems.  
 
1.4. An Overview of the Methodology  
 
Although, a detailed explanation of the methodology used in this study will be 
undertaken in the chapter third of this dissertation however, this section will briefly give 
a general overview of the research methodology of this study. This research categorizes 
as qualitative with a case study type. The context for this research is Afghanistan’s first 
presidential government with a particular focus on its executive-legislative relation. The 
research limits to the President Hamid Karzai first term presidency 2004-2009. To 
conduct this research, two types of data, qualitative as well as quantitative have been used. 
The data mainly collected from the Afghanistan’s nation assembly and are consist of 
interviews, official documents, and statistical information on the number of passed and 
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rejected bills initiated by the president as well as by the legislature. The interviews were 
conducted with the MPs, from both groups the government supporters and the 
oppositions.     
 
1.5. The Delimitation of the Study 
 
As it is described earlier, this study is a single case study on the Afghanistan’s first 
democratically elected presidential government 2004-2009. Primarily, it has focused on 
the executive-legislative relation during the President Hamid Karzai first presidency 
aiming at identifying the factors which had high impact on the executive-legislative 
relation as well as on the MPs behavior.   
 
However, as the case study itself, particularly the single case study is sometimes 
criticized lacking generalizability, means that the concepts used in a given case study’s 
research, and the related outcomes of that may not be applicable to other cases. Therefore, 
the current study also faces such limitation as the factors that it found to be the most 
influential factors influencing the executive-legislative relation in favor of the president, 
may or may not be applicable to other cases. It is because of the specific characteristics of 
the country’s state and society relations. The long engagement of Afghanistan with war 
either, due to foreign invasion or civil-war, made the power relation in the country to 
appear more on an informal base, through personal ties and not via formal institutions 
such disciplined political parties. With the exception of newly emerged political parties, 
since 2001, most of the long established political parties have ethno-military 
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characteristics which are, hardly, functioning under a democratic rule. Most of the 
political deals particularly related to the national issues are made behind the scene rather 
than being publically announced. In fact, such characteristics of Afghanistan make it 
difficult for the generalization of the findings of this study.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Frameworks on the Role of 
Presidentialism and its Application to the Afghanistan Case  
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The concern for survival as well as consolidation of the new democracies has been, for 
almost half century, one of the main issues at the core of scholarly debates among 
political scientists. To diagnose the problem of instability and collapse of the new as well 
as established democracies and to prescribe the proper solution for it has led scholars 
from variety of discipline within the political science to raise provocative ideas and 
hypotheses. The most attracting hypothesis which forms part of “the new 
institutionalism” literature in comparative politics studies, offers that “political 
democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions but also on the design of 
political institutions” [Stepan & Skach. 1993: 1].            
 
 Such an emphasize that bear the idea that political institutions, particularly the form of 
government, influence the survival of democracies opened up a new direction to the study 
of democracies’ stability and survival for political scientists. In fact, it was the students of 
comparative politics that through their theoretical as well as empirical studies found a 
correlation between democracies collapse and form of government by comparing the 
record of democracies, started from the so-called third wave of democratization, for 
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example see Linz [1990] and Stepan and Skach [1993]. The comparison had unveiled that, 
the majority of democracies, who faced instability and collapse, had a presidential form 
of government. In contrary, the rate of regime stability and survival among parliamentary 
democracies were high which, included even some of the countries with deeply divided 
society such as India, which is also categorized as one of those longest democracies in the 
world. 
Searching for the reasons behind the instability of presidential democracy, some of the 
scholars within the school of comparative politics have found certain factors inherent in 
the institutional structure of presidentialism causing political gridlock, executive-
legislative conflict, and regime breakdown. Most notable among these factors is the 
factor of separation of power which is the principle characteristic of presidential system 
and the main cause of the major problems associated with the presidential system.  
 
However, there are some other scholars who are generally agree that presidential system 
had weak performances with democratic stability, nonetheless they are arguing that there 
is variations in the performance of presidential systems and they attribute this variations 
to a series of lower-level institutional choices, such as president’s formal legislative 
powers, electoral calendar, electoral laws, political party system, and so on. Therefore, 
they do not see the problem in the institutional structure of presidentialism itself; rather 
they see it in those lower-level institutional factors. [Kent Eaton. 2000: 357].  
 
Despite, the disagreement among the scholars over the direct link of presidentialism and 
democracy’s breakdown, still there are bunch of criticism against presidential system.  
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Thus, in the following subsections of this chapter, first we are going to review some of 
those major arguments against presidentialism and second we will pointing out to some 
of those factors which are believed by the scholars of presidentialism to facilitate 
instability, political gridlock and institutional paralysis within the presidential system. 
Then it will be examined that what sorts of these factors are existed in the case of 
Afghanistan’s presidential system. 
 
2.2. Major Arguments against Presidentialism 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the idea that the form of government influencing the 
survival of democracies became one of the most debated issues in the field of 
comparative politics. Juan Linz [1990] was one of the leading scholars, who first develop 
the argument about the superiority of parliamentary over presidential institutions which 
later guided most of the discussion about the prospects of democracies established in the 
wake of the so called third wave of democratization [Jose A. Cheibub. 2002:1]. In his 
seminal article (Perils of Presidentialism) Juan Linz [1990] had comparative analysis of 
parliamentary and presidential institutions. In that article, he has pointed out to some of 
the major institutional differences between both systems and has argued that; some of 
institutional characteristics inherent in presidential system have made this system to 
appear very week, compare to parliamentary system, in terms of democratic stability and 
consolidation. His major arguments against those characteristics of presidentialism which 
have been raised in Perils of presidentialism are as follows: 
 19 
 
Winner-take-all:  
 
Presidentialism has the logic of winner-take-all that makes it inimical to the democratic 
stability. It is because that, “the winner-take-all is an arrangement that tends to make 
democratic politics a zero-sum game, with the all potential for conflict such games 
portend” [Linz.1990:54]. Linz comparing this point of presidential system with 
parliamentary system by arguing that; although parliamentary election might produce an 
absolute majority for a particular party, however it more often gives representatives to a 
number of parties. And power-sharing as well as coalition-building are always possible 
under such a system. By contrast, in presidential system, the direct popular election is 
likely to imbue presidents with a feeling that they need not to go for building coalitions 
and making concession to the opposition. Furthermore, he stated:  
 
The danger that zero-sum presidential elections pose is compounded by the rigidity of the 
president’s fixed term in office. Winners and losers are sharply defined for the entire period of the 
presidential mandate. There is no hope fro shifts in alliances, expansion of the government’s base 
of support through national-unity or emergency grand coalitions, new elections in response to 
major new events, and son on, Instead, the losers must wait at least four or five years without any 
access to executive power and patronage [ Juan Linz.1990: 56].  
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Dualism:  
 
Dual legitimacy is another factor inherent in the institutional structure of presidential 
system which facilitates the emergence of potential conflict between executive and 
legislative branches. It is more because that in the presidential system the head of 
executive as well as head of legislative branches have competing claims to legitimacy, 
both are elected through general and direct elections, and thus the origin and survival of 
each are independent from the other. Therefore, since both the president and the 
legislature has a legitimate sources of power, which is derived from the vote of the people, 
and because of the complexity of the relation between executive and legislative, the 
possibility of conflict between these two body is always there; no democratic principle 
exists within the presidential constitution to resolve when such conflict happened. In 
contrary, the problem of dual legitimacy does not exist in parliamentary system, because 
the executive is not independent of the legislature, and if the majority of the assembly 
wants to bring a change in policy direction, it can change the government by exercising 
its no confidence vote [Linz. 1990: 62-63].  
 
Fixed Term:  
 
The fixed term of the president’s office is another institutional characteristic of 
presidential system which is believed to have a negative impact on the stability of 
democracy under the presidential regime. A presidential constitution allows the president 
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to stay in office for a fixed term of four or five years, and it can not be prematurely ended 
or extended beyond the fixed term. In fact, this characteristic of presidential system 
causes difficulties in handling major crisis. In the crisis situation, because of president’s 
fixed term of office, it would be difficult to depose a president, who is not able to handle 
the situation, attempting to do so might easily endanger the regime’s survival. Also due to 
the fixed term in office, a president who has proved to be not qualified enough for 
leading the country and has lost popularity among the mass or even within his own 
political party will still stay at the office. Also, a president who is very successful and 
people want him can not extend his term. Therefore, even a qualified president can not 
implement his projects and plans because of the shortage of time which is problem in 
itself. As Juan Linz has stated “anxiety about policy discontinuities and the character of 
possible successors encourage sense of urgency…that may lead to ill-conceived policy 
initiatives, overly hasty stabs at implementation, unwarranted anger at the lawful 
opposition, and a host of other evils” [Linz. 1990:66]. In contrast, parliamentary system 
does offer such flexibility, unsuccessful head of government can be removed by the 
democratic principle of no-confidence vote, and there is a chance for a successful head of 
government to be in office again when his political party when the election.  
 
The above mentioned arguments against presidentialism which firs raised by Juan Linz, 
and later other scholars, Stepan and Scatch [1993], Horowitz [1992] had contributed, 
criticized the institutional characteristic of presidential system for causing democratic 
instability, executive-legislative conflict, institutional paralysis, and regime breakdown. 
However, as it is mentioned earlier in this section that, there are some other scholars 
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within the school of comparative politics who are, to some extent, disagree with Linz 
arguments. For instance, Maria Mustapic [2002] has stated that the independent electoral 
sources of the two branches should not be potential sources of gridlock where presidents 
can count on a reliable majority in the legislature, arguing that “the risks of immobilism 
and gridlock become active only when factors external to the institutional design of 
presidentialism intervene”. In this regards, she stressed the importance of electoral results 
and incentive structures that favor party discipline. Also, she has asserted that the risks 
that the fixed mandate generates can be relieved if the president has the capacity to 
generate the necessary parliamentary support. According to her, such a capacity rests not 
only on the personal qualities of the leader, but also on two other factors that influence 
executive-legislative relations which are; access to institutional powers and partisan 
resources that can help the president discipline legislators [ Mustapic.2002: 24].  
 
Also, scholars such as Shugart and Mainwaring [1997] have debated the efficacy of 
presidential regime for the survival of democracy. Throughout this book, they have tried 
to show that there is variation on the functioning and performance of presidential regimes 
and thus doing so they have challenged the previous consensus which had focused 
entirely on the flaws of presidentialism and not enough on the prevailed cases of 
presidential system. According to them; previous literature such as Perils of 
presidentialism [1990] has treated presidentialism as a homogeneous type which they see 
it as mistaken assumption arguing that; there is some variation of presidentialism, for 
instance, in the area of president’s constitutional powers and authorities or at the party 
system. These factors (president’s strong constitutional powers or two party systems) are 
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more likely to promote stable presidential democracy [Shugart & Mainwaring. 1997:399]. 
However, presidentialism still can not be a safe system and in some situations may face 
the difficulties of surviving. As, Shugart and Mainwaring [1997] have asserted that, a 
combination of presidentialism and fractionalized multi-party system is unfavorable with 
the stable democracy and generates gridlock as well as conflict between executive and 
legislative. 
 
Presidentialism and Fractionalized Multi-party System:  
 
Scholars, who are disagree with the arguments which correlate the causes of executive-
legislative deadlock as well as institutional paralysis of presidential system to its 
institutional characteristics, believe that these problems are caused mainly by the 
intervention of external factors to it11. For example, Shugart and Mainwaring [1997] 
argue that the number of party, as an external factor, has a great deal of impact on the 
functioning as well as performances of presidential system. If the number of party is high 
then the likelihood of executive-legislative conflict is high too, because the president’s 
party can not occupy majority seat within the assembly and thus it increase the chances of 
president having little legislative support [Shugart and Mainwaring. 1997:396] see 
also[ Jones. 1995: 10].  
In fact, the argument of Shugart and Mainwaring [1997] that the combination of 
presidentialism and fractionalized multi-party system is unfavorable to stable democracy 
has been supported by the empirical evidences too. As the data on the survival of 
                                                
11 - External factors indicate to those factors which are not part of institutional structure presidentialism 
such as the number of parties which can be different from country to country.  
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presidential governments shows, majority of those presidential regimes which survived a 
long period of time had two or maximum three party system and those which had short 
life characterized with a fragmented party system [Mainwaring. 1990: 168].     
  
Another argument on the combination of presidentialism and fractionalized multi-party 
system is that it encourages the emergence of minority and divided government which is 
another sources of executive-legislative deadlock [Mainwaring. 1990: 16]. It is because 
the situation of highly fragmented party system, leave less chance for the president’s 
party to have the control of majority seats within the congress. Therefore, in both, 
minority and divided governments, the president’s party does not have a majority 
position and thus the assembly is usually in the control of opposition group. These 
situations are perceived by the scholars, particularly the student of political institution in 
Latin America to be problematic, always associated with gridlock; unconstitutional, 
unilateral actions; and inter branch strife [Negretto. 2006: 64].   
 
In sum, what can be deduced from the arguments of both categories of scholars is that 
presidential system, in general, is prone to executive-legislative conflict, institutional 
paralysis, regime instability, and breakdown of democracy. The roots of problems 
associated with presidentialism have been traced partly in the institutional structure of 
presidentialism, and as some of the scholars have argued, partly it can be attributed to the 
intervention of external factors to it. Therefore, based on both categories of arguments, 
chances for democracies which have a presidential base are high to be doomed to 
executive-legislative conflict, institutional paralysis, and breakdown. Particularly, as it 
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has been asserted by scholars that the combination of presidentialism and fractionalized 
multi-party system is inimical to democratic stability, because of causing minority and 
divided government. 
 
 2.3- Case of Afghanistan’s Presidential Government 2004-2009  
 
 In the case of Afghanistan’s first presidential government, we can see also a combination 
of presidentialism and a highly fractionalized party system characteristic. Although, the 
country’s electoral law enacted in 2004, gave unofficial role to the political parties by 
forcing candidates for the parliamentary election to stand as individual candidate but still 
14 percent of candidates entered parliament with a clear political affiliation on their 
registration form. Many other successful candidates were unofficially affiliated to 
political parties [Asia Report. 2006: 7]. In fact, the provision of the electoral law which 
restricted a direct role of political parties in parliamentary election caused the Afghan 
national assembly to be highly fragmented not only along political ideology but also 
along ethno-religious line.  
 
As it has been showed in table 2.3.1, the political affiliation of the MPs has reached to as 
many as 20 political groups. The largest group within the Wolesi Jirga or House of 
Representative consists of former member of Mujahedeen groups (who use to fight 
against former Soviet Union) which counts for almost half of the Wolesi Jirga, although 
they are not homogeneous group but they all appear to support a broadly conservative 
agenda [Asia Report. 2006: 8]. Around 34 MPs were associated with former Leftists 
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groups (former Khalq and Parcham parties)12, they are also not a unified group and are 
spilled within the several newly established parties with a democrats and moderates 
platform. Tow MPs, who can be characterized as Islamic conservatives were former high 
rank Taliban’s member. 
                                                
12 - Khalq and Parcham were two factions of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, founded by 
Noor Mohammad Taraki in 1965. The party was founded on Marxist-Leninist principles, and believed on a 
one-party, heavily secularized state. In 67, the PDPA party split into two factions, Khalq (People or Mass) 
led by Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, and Parcham (Banner) led by Babrak Karmal. In 1978, they took the 
power in Afghanistan and was leading the country until 1991, see [ Asia Briefing No 39. 2005: 2].   
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Table 2.3.1 MPs political Affiliation 
 
Source: NDI 
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However, most of the major political groups showed in table 2.3.1, can be best 
characterized as ethno-nationalist groups such as the Junbesh-e- Milli-e-Islami (National 
Islamic Movement) party advocating Uzbek nationalist program, or the party of Wahdat-
e- Islami, (Islamic Unity Party) which is divided to several factions and almost all of 
them carry the same name and are pro-Hazara nationalism, and the Afghan Millat 
(Afghan Nation) party with a Pashtun nationalist orientation. 
 
Beside the presences of a high number of political parties, the presence of as high as 72 
number of independent MPs, who were seem to be not belong to any political groups was 
another factor causing Wolesi Jirga to become more fragmented. Around 30 independent 
MPs had the experience of working with NGOs or involving in business, and have 
espoused democracy, human rights or free markets. And the others were some 
conservative elements including local powerbrokers and tribal leaders [Asia Report. 
2006: 8].  
 
As it is mentioned before, the Afghan National Assembly was not only fragmented due to 
its political composition but also it was fragmented because of its ethnic make up.  
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Table 2.3.2 Ethnic/ Religious groups’ share of seats within the Wolesi Jirga 
 
Source: AREU 
As it is showing in table 2.3.2, there were representatives from around 11 ethno-religious 
groups within the Wolesi Jirga. Out of the 11 ethno-religious groups, four have the most 
shares of seats. Pashtuns seems to be the largest group but not the majority, occupies 118 
seats, Tajiks are the second group with 53 seats, and Hazaras with 30 seats took the third 
place and the Uzbeks are the fourth largest group occupying 20 seats. 
 
In fact, the fragmented multi-party system dominating the country’s political arena did 
facilitate the emergence of a divided government in which President Hamid Karzai had to 
deal with a lower house led by opposition group13.  Therefore, the fear of political 
deadlock and conflict between the executive and the legislature has been on the agenda 
since the inauguration of the national assembly in 2005. Since President Hamid Karzai 
did not have his own political party to be rely on its support within the assembly, 
                                                
13 - The lower house led by Mohammad Younus Qanooni, one of the leader of Jamiat-e-Islami party and 
leader of Afghanistan-e- Naveen party, a faction of Jamait-e-Islami Party. 
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therefore he turned his full support to his fellow Pashtun, Abdur Rab Rasul Sayaf the 
leader of the Islamic Unity party (Etehad-e Islami), and backed him for the election for 
the speaker of the parliament. But, the election result did not please him, as his main rival 
Mohammed Yunus Qanoni, who was also his rival candidate for the presidency which 
stood till to the end, won the post and became the head of the Wolesi Jirga 
[Johnson.2006:21]. Thus, with the control of legislature in the hands of the opposition 
leader, the Afghan government faced an actual division of power, signaling the 
emergence of a conflicting executive-legislative relationship.  
 
 However, the case of Afghanistan’s first presidential government demonstrated 
unexpected result which contradicts with both aforementioned categories of arguments 
raised by scholars on the causes of weakness of presidential system. First, as a pure 
presidential system, it bore all the institutional defects that Juan Linz had been pointed 
out and believed that they are the main cause of instability and breakdown of presidential 
democracies. Second, it had a highly fractionalized multi-party system which caused it to 
fall into divided government, and based on the Shugard and Mainwaring argument, it 
could have been a potential factor generating executive-legislative gridlock. Third and the 
last, President Hamid Karzai by lacking his own political party, was deprive of the most 
significant source of  power, as Maria Mustapic stated, which enables a president to have 
influence over the congress and discipline legislators [ Mustapic.2002:24]. Nevertheless, 
despite all these actual potential for gridlock and conflict, Afghanistan’s first presidential 
government did survive without experiencing any serious executive-legislative 
confrontation. 
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Therefore, Afghanistan’s first presidential government posing a puzzling question; Why, 
despite containing the seeds propitious for generating executive-legislative conflict and 
institutional paralysis the first term of President Hamid Karzai presidency had been 
successfully reached to its end?  
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Chapter 3: Research Design  
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter is explaining the method of research which has been designed for this study. 
In order to give a clear view of the present study’s research design, this chapter will 
specifying the research perspective and methodology, identifying the type of the study, 
and delimiting the scope of the study in terms of time  as well as the context of it. Also, 
this chapter describes the study’s concerned dependent and independent variables with 
the explanation of how the concerned variables are going to be measured, as well as it 
explains what type of data will be used and how was the process of data collecting and 
analyzing. 
 
3.2. Research Questions 
 
As it is discussed in the second chapter that one of the main characteristics of presidential 
system is that this system is more prone to instability, executive-legislative conflict as 
well as institutional paralysis than any other form of democratic government. And 
according to the scholars’ theoretical as well as empirical driven arguments, the 
possibility of executive-legislative gridlock is high in cases where combination of 
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presidentialism and highly fragmented multi-party system exists. Particularly, when the 
president’s party does not have the control of majority’s seats and instead the 
opposition’s party does have a majority status within the assembly which is the situation 
of divided government. However, against this background, President Hamid Karzai’s 
first government demonstrates quite a puzzling case. Despite the dominance of a highly 
fragmented party system and despite the lack of President Hamid Karzai own political 
party which its absence caused him to face a divided government with the legislature 
leading by opposition group, yet Afghanistan’s first presidential government offers a 
successful story. None of those problems associated with presidentialism happened in the 
Afghanistan case. President Hamid Karzai was, to a great degree, able to garner 
legislators’ support necessary to secure the passage of his legislative initiatives and thus 
compensate the lack of his partisan power. In fact, by being able to generate majority’s 
support (though not a constant majority’s support), President Hamid Karzai could avoid 
the occurrences of any serious conflict or political deadlock between executive and 
legislative during his first government.  
 
Therefore, the case of President Hamid Karzai’s first government lead to the emergence 
of following puzzling questions, which searching for the proper answers to these 
questions constitutes the primary goal of the study.           
 
1- Why it was easy for president Karzai to gain legislator’s support in legislature housing 
none of his co-partisan? 
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2-Why president Karzai was able to avoid serious confrontation with the legislature led                         
by his opposition figure Yonus Qanoni? 
 
3.3. Method and Type of the Study 
 
The method for this study will be a qualitative single case study with a comparative 
approach. Although, it is stated that a single case study can not be considered as 
genuinely comparative, due to the lack of “external validity”. As it is said by Castles, and 
Vergunst, “a single case study can be used for developing hypotheses and reasons of 
validation post hoc to inspect whether or not the general results of a comparative analysis 
hold up in a more detailed analysis” [ Pennings, Keman and Jan Kleinnijenhuis. 2005: 
20].    
 
 However, by some reasons the method for this study can, some how, fall into 
comparative approach. To evaluate the degree of legislators’ support to President Hamid 
Karzai, during his first presidency, a comparative approach will be used to analyze the 
results of the MPs confidence vote over the both cabinets’ nominees in President Hamid 
Karzai first and second government. This means that one procedure, which is the MPs 
confidence vote over the cabinet’s nominees, will be compared within the different 
period of first and second presidency.  Also, in order to see which branch was dominant 
in legislation process, the executive or the legislature? The data on the number of 
successful legislations of both branches will be comparatively analyzed.  
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3.4. Context of the Study 
 
Generally the study is an analysis of Afghanistan’s first democratically elected 
presidential government 2004-2009, with a specific focus on the executive-legislative 
relation. The primary aim of the study is to answer the questions that; why a relatively 
cooperative environment was dominant on the relation between executive and legislative 
branches during President Hamid Karzai first government, and why President Hamid 
Karzai was able to garner majority’s support while lacking the partisan power? Thus, the 
bulk of the study has taken place in the Afghanistan’s national assembly, particularly, in 
its Lower house or Wolesi Jirga.     
 
3.5. Concerned Variables 
Dependent Variable: 
 
The stability as well as the survival of any presidential government heavily hinged on the 
success of president garnering majority’s support within the legislature to secure the 
passages of his or her proposed bills or policies. In contrast, a presidential government 
will face executive-legislative conflict, instability, and collapse while the president fails 
to generate majority’s support. Thus, in order to analyze the executive-legislative relation 
in President Hamid Karzai’s first government, this study treats the legislators’ support to 
president’s legislative initiatives as dependent variable. The aim is to see how the degree 
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of President Hamid Karzai success in marshaling legislators’ support was during his first 
presidency. 
 
The units of measurement for the applied dependent variable are a) the high number of 
passed bills initiated by president and confirmed by the legislature and b) the legislature’s 
confirmation of a high number president’s cabinet nominees. The analysis of the two 
following parliamentary procedures, which their accomplishment required a majority’s 
vote, will be undertaken.  
 
The first procedure is the Wolesi Jirga’s floor voting, in the process of law-making, over 
the proposed bills, particularly those of bills which initiated by the president. In this 
regards, in each years, the number of passed and defeated proposed bills by the president 
will be counted as determinant of president’s success or failure, in the way that, the less 
defeated and more passed bills will show that the president was successful in generating 
needed legislators’ support and was dominant in legislation process, and the vice versa .  
 
And the second procedure is the legislators’ confidence vote over president’s cabinet 
nominees. In order to find out to what extent legislators’ did support President Hamid 
Karzai during his first presidency, a comparative analysis of legislature’s confidence vote 
over cabinet nominees will be undertaken in both period, President Hamid Karzai’s first 
as well as second presidency. The aim is to view that in both periods, how many of 
president’s ministerial nominees has gotten the legislature’s confidence vote as well as 
how many got no-confidence vote. And if the majority of the cabinet’s nominees 
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succeeded to get the legislature’s confidence vote, then it will confirm that president had 
influence over the legislature decision making and had been able to generate legislative 
support to secure the confirmation of his cabinet nominees by the Wolesi Jirga.   
 
Independent Variables: 
 
In order to find out, why President Hamid Karzai, despite facing a divided government 
with legislature led by the opposition as well as lacking a partisan power, was still able to 
generate majority’s support and thus, avoiding serious confrontation with the assembly, 
an attempt has been made to test the following variables. The first variable will be treated 
as the main independent variable, however the second and third variables will be 
considered as less significant variable. 
 
Cabinet Coalition building:    
 
One of the strategies that a minority president can use to overcome a deadlock situation 
and to obtain support within the assembly is cabinet coalition building. A minority 
president can distribute the cabinet posts to political parties to seal a formal alliance with 
other parties in the assembly. If the cabinet is consists of members of political parties that 
communally direct a majority of seats in the legislature, then there is possibility that the 
government’s proposals achieve majority support in congress even if the president’s party 
alone has only a minority legislative status[Gabriel L. Negretto. 2006: 37].  
.  
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Therefore, the study treats the strategy of cabinet coalition building as one of the 
principle factor which had huge impact on the legislators’ behavior as well as on the 
executive-legislative relation during the President Hamid Karzai first government. 
In the absence of president’s partisan power, the strategy of building coalition through 
distributing ministerial portfolios to the different ethno-political groups is believed to be 
one of the most significant factors enabling President Hamid Karzai to generate 
majority’s support within the national assembly and thus securing the passage of his 
parliamentary proposals.  
The impact of cabinet coalition building factor on the executive-legislative relation and 
particularly on the legislators’ behavior will be measured through examining the 
composition of the coalitional cabinet, before and after some changes brought to it.   
 
Crisis Situation (Taliban military threat): 
   
Crisis situation is another factor which can impact on the executive-legislative relation by 
leaving strong motivation for the legislature to be cooperative with the executive. It also 
can bestow on the president new power resources in the way that, due to the confronted 
crisis situation the legislature may give extra authorities to the president to fight the crisis 
situation. For the purpose of this study, the crisis situation has been defined as military 
crisis which is caused by the Taliban’s constant insurgencies against the Afghan 
government. To see how the factor of crisis situation had impact on the legislators’ 
behavior, the shift on the policies of President Hamid Karzai towards Taliban, from anti-
Taliban to negotiation policies will be analyzed. 
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Distribution of Patronage or Material benefits to the MPs:      
 
The distributions of material benefits direct to an individual MP, or through a MP to a 
group of people that is the government’s “Pork barrel” spending, is another factor, though 
less significant but still had impact on executive-legislative relation as well as MPs 
behavior. To see how this factor was becoming as incentive mechanism for the MPs to 
support the president, the study will undertake the analysis of some of the examples that 
show how President Karzai was benefiting for such strategy.    
 
3.6. Data  
In this study, generally, both qualitative as well as quantitative sort of data has been used 
however; they are analyzed solely in a qualitative method. Data used in this study has 
been gathered during a field research in Afghanistan in 2009, and they are consisting of 
interviews and some statistical data. 
 
Interviews: 
 
The interviews, mainly, conducted with the MPs from both pro-government and 
opposition group within the Lower house of Afghanistan’s national assembly. The 
interviews were based on a standardized, open-ended question, in a one to one method. 
To collect the interviews a vice recording devise has been used. 
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Statistical data:  
 
The statistical data used for this study have been collected from the Afghanistan’s 
parliament, particularly from the Wolesi Jirga, and they are consists of the record of 
passed and defeated bills which were initiated by the president, as well as it includes the 
record of legislature’s vote confidence on President Hamid Karzai’s ministerial nominees 
for both his first and second cabinet.  
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Chapter 4: Executive, legislative relations During President 
Hamid Karzai’s First Government 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter first the term executive legislative will be discussed in general then it will 
explain how was the relation between executive and legislative branches during President 
Hamid Karzai’s first government 2004-2009. Discussing on the executive-legislative 
relation in Afghanistan, we start first with the analysis of constitutionally endued 
authorities and powers of the president as well as the legislature and then the relation 
between these two will be discussed by how was the degree of legislators’ support to the 
president. 
 
 “Every modern democratic regime relies fundamentally upon institutional linkages 
between a legislature, charged with representing the will of the people in the process of 
making the laws of the land, and an executive, charged with implementing these laws” 
[Michael Laver.1999:5].  
 
Thus, one of the very important themes in the studies of Presidentialism is the study of 
relation between executive and legislative branch of a presidential government. The term 
executive- legislative relation generally refers to the sets of fundamental privileges and 
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responsibilities to the legislature and executive which shapes the mechanism of 
interaction between both branches of government. However, there are always some 
additional factors which can strongly influence the executive-legislative relation: 
encouraging cooperation or rewarding confrontation between the branches [NDI. Paper 
No 6: 5]. In fact, the relation between the executive and legislative branches is inherently 
a power relationship and more accurately a power struggle. What this implies is that; the 
degree of constitutionally endued powers to each of these branches has a great impact on 
their relations, influencing it in favor of one branch or the other. In terms of measuring 
the balance of power between the legislature and the executive, Lijphart distinguishes 
between three system categories: those with legislative dominance, those with executive 
dominance, and those which are relatively balanced. According to him, standard 
presidential systems with separation of powers system tend to have executive-legislative 
balance [Liphart. 1999:129].  
 
The executive-legislative balance under the separation of power system means that both 
branches drive its legitimacy to govern from different sources such as having separate 
electoral base. In fact, the separation of power characteristics of a presidential system 
seemed to be problematic generating conflict prone executive-legislative relation. It has 
been argued that conflict between the executive and the legislative is more likely in a 
presidential regime [Linz.1990:62]. It is because of separated electoral sources and due to 
fixed terms of office which discourage politicians in both branches of government from 
moderating their stances or seeking new coalition partners [Carles and Susan C. Stokes. 
2007: 714]. Also, it is believed that the separation of power of a presidential system tends 
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to generate minority governments and immobilism, particularly in the situation of highly 
fragmented party systems. Under such circumstances, the president is likely to face a 
decisive majority in the assembly, so pushing through policy measures is apt to be 
difficult,  thus what the result would be is immobilism and conflict between the executive 
and the legislative which often leads to the decision making paralysis [Scott 
Mainwaring.1990:17]. Therefore, with regards to the problem of minority or in a way 
divided government which the principle of separation of powers would, probably, cause, 
the main challenge for a president would be; how to garner a working majority within the 
legislature to secure the passages of his legislative’s proposals, or how to avoid gridlocks 
and build a cooperative based executive-legislative relation. In this regards, the 
president’s strong constitutional power may play a significant role enabling him to have 
influence over the legislation process. 
 
 However, as mentioned above, there are other factors as well that can having an impact 
on the executive-legislative relation. For instance, the factor of president’s partisan power 
has an impact; if the president’s party has the control of majority or close to majority’s 
seats in the legislature then he will enjoy the majority’s support and thus will not face any 
difficulties with the assembly securing the passage of his legislative proposals. Thus, as it 
is stated by Shugart and Mainwaring; “the interaction of president’s constitutional and 
partisan powers shapes the character of executive-legislative relations and largely 
determines the ability of presidents to turn a legislative program into policy” [Shugart 
and Mainwaring.1997:13].    
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In order to determine how was the executive-legislative relation during President Hamid 
Karzai’s first presidency, the following sections of this chapter are dealing; first with the 
analysis of both president and the legislature’s constitutional sources of power, and then 
the degree of legislators’ support to President Hamid Karzai by examining the numbers 
of passed and defeated bills initiated by the president will be analyzed; as well as the 
legislators’ confidence vote for his cabinet nominees. 
 
4.1.1. President Legislative Powers 
 
The 2004 Afghan constitution gave an array of powers to the president which range from 
supervising the implementation of the constitution (clause 1, article 64), Being the 
commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of Afghanistan (clause 3, article 64), on the 
important national, political, social as well as economic issues can call for a referendum 
of the people of Afghanistan (article 65), endorse laws as well as judicial decrees (clause 
16, article 64) amending the constitution [ Wolesi Jirga, Afghanistan 2004 constitution]. 
However, the most important legislative powers that the constitution endued to the 
president are as follows: President’s veto powers, power of issuing legislative decrees, 
and exclusive power of legislative introduction.  
 
Veto Power: this is one of the most important legislative powers, given that it gives rights 
to the president to reject a bill sent to his desk by the legislature. It is a “reactive” 
legislature power allowing the president to defend the status quo by reacting to the 
legislature’s attempt to alter it [Scott and Matthew Shugart. 1997:43]. According to the 
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Afghan constitution, President Hamid Karzai can veto whatever bills sent to him from the 
national assembly; however, the vetoed bill must be sent back to the national assembly, 
with clear reasons why it has been vetoed, within the 15 days from the date of its 
submission to the president office. If the bill is not sent within the required time, or if it is 
sent to the national assembly (particularly to the Wolesi Jirga) but if the Wolesi Jirga 
reapproves the vetoed bill with a two-third of its majority vote, the vetoed bill will 
automatically become law [ Srelan Gaplan. 2007: 20]. 
 
Decree Power:  Unlike the President’s veto power, which is the President’s “reactive” 
power, the decree power of the President is more a “proactive” power, which means that 
the decree power allows the president to establish a new status quo of whatever he likes. 
On the other hand, the president’s decree power enables him to legislate independently 
without concerning much about the legislator’s consent [Scott and Matthew. 1997:44]. 
According to the 2004 constitution, the Afghan President is allowed to issue legislative 
decrees (except on the issues such as budget and financial) even at the time that the 
national assembly is in its formal vacation; however, when the national assembly returns 
from vacation, the issued decrees must be sent, within 30 days, to the national assembly 
after its first session convened14.   
                    
Exclusive Power of Legislative Introduction: besides the veto and decree power that the 
Afghan president has been titled to use them; also he or she has the right of exclusive 
introduction of legislative proposals in certain policy areas. Often this exclusive power 
extends to some critical matters such as budget, but also the creation of new bureaucratic 
                                                
14 - Article 79 of the Afghanistan’s 2004 constitution. 
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offices, and laws concerning tariff and credit policies15. Indeed, these are the areas that 
only the president has the right to propose bills and the national assembly has only the 
right to generally reject or propose amendment to them. 
 
4.1.2. National Assembly’s Legislative Power 
 
Unlike any other Presidential constitution, the Afghan 2004 constitution endued the 
Afghan national assembly with a great deal of authorities and power which is in some 
calculation over the president constitutional powers. The duties and most important 
authorities that the Afghan national assembly has at hand are as follows: 
 
- Ratification, modification or abrogation of laws or legislative decrees (clause 1 of 
article ninety). 
- Approval of the state budget as well as permission to obtain or grant loans (clause 3 
of article ninety). 
- Ratification of international treaties and agreements, or abrogation of membership 
of Afghanistan in them (clause 5 of article ninety). 
- House the People or Wolesi Jirga, on the proposal of twenty percent of all its 
members shall make inquires from each minster, and if the explanations given are 
not satisfactory, the House the Representatives shall consider the issue of a no 
confidence vote ( article ninety-tow) 
                                                
15 - Article 95 of 2004 constitution. 
 47 
- The President is responsible to the nation as well as the House of Representatives. 
Accusations of crimes against humanity, national reason as well as other crimes the 
President shall be demanded by one third of all members of the House of 
Representatives. If this demand is approved by two thirds of the House 
Representatives, the House of Representatives shall convene the Loya Jirga (Afghan 
traditional grand council) within one month and if the Loya Jirga, by two-thirds 
majority approves the accusation, the President shall be released from duty and the 
issue shall be refereed to a special court (Article sixty nine).   
 
However, the most important legislative authority, which has been given by the 
constitution to the national assembly, is the power of overriding the President’s veto. 
According to the Article ninety-four of the constitution, no bills become law unless 
approved by the National-Assembly. In case the President rejects what the National-
Assembly has approved, and if the House of the People re-approved it with two-thirds of 
all the votes, the draft will be considered endorsed and enforceable. Thus, the two-third 
of Wolesi Jirga’s majority’s vote is a significant legislative power which can override the 
President’s vetoed bills and give no chance to him to fight back, because once the Wolesi 
Jirga is able to get the two-third of majority’s vote, the vetoed bill by the President 
automatically becomes law.  
 
4.2. Legislators’ Support to President’s initiatives  
Throughout the vast literature on the comparative politics, students of Presidentialism 
have been frequently asserting that the survival as well as the stability of a presidential 
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democracy depends on the success of president garnering majorities support within the 
legislature. Further, on the failure of many presidential regimes has shown that, when the 
president has frequently failed to marshal the majority’s support necessary to secure the 
passage of his or her parliamentary initiatives, the consequence has been severe conflict 
between the executive and legislative branches which are always followed by a 
governance crisis and regime breakdowns. Therefore, the variable of legislators’ support 
of president initiatives can be counted as a significant determinant factor of stability and 
survival of any presidential government. 
 
Thus, for the purpose of this study, the legislative support of president’s initiatives can be 
translated as a degree of the presidents’ ability to influence the assembly, putting their 
own stamp on legislative policy to get an agenda enacted. Having such influence over the 
national assembly in turn means that presidents can win the consent of a working 
majority and therefore can secure the passage of his or her legislative initiatives. 
However, the way that presidents can have such influence over the assembly differs 
based on the sources of powers available to them.      
 
 Through conducting empirical studies on different cases of presidential governments, 
Scholars have identified two principle ways that presidents can have such influence: one 
is to have constitutional powers inherent in the office of the presidency that allow 
presidents to have their preferences taken into consideration in the passage of legislation.           
Constitutional powers of the presidents subsume the veto power and the decree power 
[lijphart.1999:127-128]. The veto power of the presidents ensure that no bill can become 
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law without meeting the president’s approval, and the decree powers enable presidents to 
legislate independently without concerning much about the legislator’s consent. In fact, 
constitutional powers of the presidents provide them with a vast degree of influence over 
law-making as well as policy decision making processes which in turn can force the 
legislators to co-operate with, rather than to oppose the presidents. Another way that the 
presidents can have influence over the assembly is to have a strong partisan power. This 
means that the president’s party must have a majority position in the assembly or must, at 
least, control the seats which are close to majority [Matthew and Scott 
Mainwaring.1997:12]. 
 
 However, the case of Afghanistan’s first presidential government after the collapse of the 
Taliban regime, demonstrates theoretically a quite paradox case. President Hamid Karzai 
lacked, somehow, both “Constitutional” as well as “Partisan” sources of power necessary 
for influencing the assembly and garnering the majority’s support in order to secure the 
passage of his legislative initiatives. In regards to constitutional power, though, President 
Hamid Karzai had the veto as well as decree powers in hand; but they were not as 
effective as they were supposed to. This was mainly because of the assembly’s 
constitutionally granted huge power that enabled assembly to counter act. The assembly 
had the power to override both; the president’s legislative decree and vetoed bills by the 
two thirds of its majority’s vote. Thus, the assembly, always had an upper hand unless, 
President Hamid Karzai has the control of majority or close to majority of seats within 
the national assembly to hamper the assembly’s tow third of majority’s vote overriding 
his legislative decree and vetoed bills.  
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 On the other hand, President Hamid Karzai, also lacked the “partisan” sources of power 
necessary for securing the majority’s support within the assembly. He did not have his 
own political party and was elected to the presidency as an independent candidate. And 
thus, during his first term of presidency, the assembly, particularly, the lower house 
(Wolesi jirga) was, to some extent, under the control of the opposition group led by 
Mohammed Ynus Qanoni, who was elected as a head of lower house ( Wolesi jirga).  
 
Nevertheless, despite lacking both sources of powers Constitutional and Partisan, 
President Hamid Karzai had a successful record during his first three years (2005 to early 
2008). He was able to generate enough legislators’ support, securing the passage of 
majority of his parliamentary initiatives (see table 4.2.1), and thus, he was able to avoid 
any serious conflict with the national assembly. Though, the assembly’s support of 
President Hamid Karzai’s initiatives became down from 2008 to the end of his 
government mid 2009, but still he was able to avoid any serious confrontation with the 
national assembly.   
 
 To measure President Hamid Karzai’s degree of success in marshalling the majority’s 
support within the Wolesi Jirga or lower house of the Afghan national assembly, a 
detailed explanation of two following parliamentary procedures, within which the 
president has to garner an absolute majority, has been undertaken through the following 
sections.             
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4.2.1. President’s initiatives and the approval of National Assembly 
One of the major tasks ahead of any president in a presidential system is to secure the 
passage of his or her legislative initiatives. In order to do so, presidents need to garner the 
majority’s support necessary to back their legislative proposals within the assembly. 
Though, it has been mentioned earlier that the success of a president generating 
legislators’ support, depends on the degree of his constitutional and partisan sources of 
powers, however the structure of a decision-making process of any parliament is another 
factor that has influence on it. When the assembly has a centralized structure of decision- 
making process, then it is easier for a president to deal with the assembly, however, it 
becomes difficult when the decision-making process is de-centralized [Mustapic 
Ana.2002:25]. In the case of Afghanistan, the national assembly has a fully de-
centralized structure of decision making process.  The National Assembly is a bicameral 
house composed  of an Upper house ( Meshrano Jirga) and an Lower house ( Wolesi 
Jirga) thus, any bills to become law require the approval of both houses[ Afghan 
Constitution. 2004, article 94].  
 
Furthermore, the lower house (Wolesi Jirga) also has a de-centralized sort of procedure, 
while working on a bill which has been introduced to it. This means that, when the 
executive initiate a bill and send it to the Wolesi Jirga (lower house), it goes first to the 
assembly’s relevant legislative commission for the primary investigation. If the bill under 
investigation gets the approval of the relevant commission, then it can  proceed to the 
next legislating stage which is floor voting, but if the bill fails to be approved by the 
commission, then it goes back to the executive body, mainly for revision[ Wolesi 
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Jirga ,the Rules of procedure.2008:24]. What this de-centralized procedure of national 
assembly’s law making process implies is that president Karzai might have had a hard 
time dealing with the assembly in those three stages (while the proposed bill was in the 
relevant commission, floor voting stage and in the Meshrano Jirga or Upper house) to 
marshalling support for the safe passage of his proposed bill. 
Nevertheless, despite these difficulties on the way of accumulating legislators support, 
President Hamid Karzai had a quite successful story during his first term in office. 
Particularly, during the first three years of his government, most of his legislative 
initiatives have won the approval of the national assembly which shows that he was 
successful in marshalling the majority’s support.  
By legislative initiatives here we, generally, mean that those executive’s proposals which 
contained the introduction of new laws or amendments to the existed laws which require 
to be approved by assembly’s majorities. We are not referring to those proposals that 
were not requiring the assembly’s majority’s approval, such as bills related to the 
government’s policies change and so on.  
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As the table 4.2.1 shows, the three consecutive years starting from the year 2005 until the 
end of  the year 2007, the number of President Hamid Karzai’s legislative initiatives that 
has won the approval of national assembly ( Wolesi Jirga) and successfully passed and 
became law, reaches to hundred percent16. What these data reveal is that during the years 
2005 to 2007, President Hamid Karzai was successful in dominating the legislation affair 
and has been able to generate the majority’s support within the assembly to secure the 
passage of his initiatives in the mentioned years. However, the data on the year 2008 and 
2009 showing a decline on the legislators support of President Hamid Karzai’s initiatives, 
because some of his proposed bills were defeated by the Wolesi Jirga ( lower house). He 
just was able to secure the passage of 85 percent of his initiatives in 2008 and 20 percent 
                                                
16 - The president’s initiatives were not of equal values, some of them did not face difficulties being passed 
by the legislature however, there were some initiatives that were very controversial and were not easy to be 
passed in the normal situations. As an example we can named the Shiite Personal Status Law which was 
initiated by the executive. The Shiite Personal Status bill introduced to the Wolesi Jirga in 2007 and in 
2009 it signed by President Hamid Karzai and became law. For detailed informations see, Lauryn Oates 
[2009].  
Table 4.2.1 President’s Initiated Passed and    Defeated 
Bills 
Year 
Initiatives 
(Number) Passed Defeated 
2005 3 3 0 
2006 6 6 0 
2007 29 29 0 
2008 47 40 7 
2009 15 3 12 
Source: Afghanistan National Assembly, Wolesi Jirga 
Research Services Center 
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in 2009. But in a comparison with the Wolesi Jirga’s percentage of law making initiatives 
and success, we will learn that President Hamid Karzai, still was dominant in legislating 
process.  
 
Table 4.2. 2 National assembly’s Initiated Passed and 
Defeated Bills 
Year Initiative Passed Defeated 
2005 1 0 1 
2006 0 0 0 
2007 1 0 1 
2008 9 8 1 
2009 1 0 1 
Source: Afghanistan National Assembly, Wolesi Jirga 
Research Services Center 
 
 
According to the data in table 4.2.2, Wolesi Jirga, generally, had a very low record of 
legislative initiatives compared to the executive branch. During the years 2005 until 2007 
which president Karzai was quite dominant in legislating, as his entire proposed bill 
became law, Wolesi Jirga had a zero percent success in legislation. Although, the 
situation, by some reasons which will be explained in later parts, slightly changed in 2008, 
Wolesi Jirga got a degree of success on that year so as to out of nine initiated bills eight 
became law but again in the following year 2009, there was a decline on the success of 
Wolesi Jirga, they again became unable to legislate any law. 
 
 In sum, as the result of analyzed data on the number of bills which initiated by the 
executive branch and won the approval of the Wolesi Jirga and became law is showing, 
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that President Hamid Karzai was quite successful in legislating laws during his first 
government. In the absences of partisan power available to him, he was still able to 
generate enough legislators’ support needed to back his proposed bills and secure their 
passage. 
In the following section we are going to discuss another parliamentary procedure which 
its accomplishment needed an absolute majority’s vote by the assembly. 
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4.2.2. Legislators’ Confidence Vote for Ministerial Candidates  
 
The legislators’ confidence vote for ministerial candidates is another parliamentary 
procedure in which a president needs to generate an absolute majority’s support within 
the assembly in order to secure the legislators’ confidence vote for his cabinet nominees. 
 
 According to article 11 in clause 64 of the Afghanistan constitution, the president needs 
the approval of Wolesi Jirga (House of Representatives), in order to appoint his cabinet 
members. And based on clause 72, the Wolesi Jirga has the right to approve or reject the 
president’s ministerial nominees. [Afghan constitution.2004]. 
 
In order to establish the degree of success that president Hamid Karzai had in garnering 
support of legislators for the approval in his cabinet nominees during his first presidency, 
a comparative analysis of the introduction of president Hamid Karzai’s cabinets 
nominees in his first and second presidency will be undertaken. 
 
During his first presidency, President Hamid Karzai introduced his cabinet in May 2 of 
2006. Although, President Hamid Karzai was elected as president in late 2004, he 
continued his new government with the cabinet’s members from his transitional period 
until the establishment and inauguration of the new parliament in 19th December of 2005. 
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However, the national assembly’s session of vote of confidence for the president Karzai’s 
cabinet’s nominees was held in May 2 of 2006. 
 
President Hamid Karzai’s cabinet consisted of 25 ministries during his first presidency 
and thus, he introduced a list of 25 nominees to the Wolesi Jirga for confidence vote. 
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Table 4.2.2.1 President Karzai's list of Nominated Ministers proposed to the National Assembly in May 2nd, 2006 
# Ministries Nominees Approved 
1 Minister of Interior Zarar Ahmad Moqbel Yes 
2 Minister of National Defense Mohamamd Rahim Wardak Yes 
3 Minister of Commerce and Industries Haidar Riza No 
4 Minister of Finance Anwar-ul Haq Ahadi Yes 
5 Minister of Education Mohamamd Hanif Atmar Yes 
6 Minister of Higher Education Dr. Mohammad Azam Dadfar Yes 
7 Minister of Information and Culture Sayed Makhdum Rahin No 
8 Minister of Hajj and Islamic Affairs Nematullah Shahrani Yes 
9 Minister of Justice Mohammad Sarwar Danish Yes 
10 Minister of Transport and Aviation Gul Hussien Ahmadi No 
11 Minister of Mines Ibrahim Adel Yes 
12 Minister of Energy and Water Mohammad Ismael Khan Yes 
13 
Minister of Agriculture, Irrigation and 
Livestock 
Obidullah Ramin 
Yes 
14 Minister of Counter Narcotics Habibullah Qaderi Yes 
15 Minister of Border and Tribal Affairs Abdul Karim Barahawi Yes 
16 Minister of Returnees and Refugees Mohammad Akbar Yes 
17 Minister of Public Health Mohammad Amin Fatimi Yes 
18 Minister of Public Welfare Sohrab Ali Safari Yes 
19 Minister of Economy Dr. Mohammad Jalil Shams No 
20 
Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development 
Mohammad Ehsan Zia 
Yes 
21 Minister of Communication Amir Zai Sangeen Yes 
22 Minister of Women Affairs Soraya Sobhrang No 
23 
Minister of Work, Social Affairs, Martyred, 
and Disabled 
Noor Mohammad Qarqeen 
Yes 
24 Minister Of Urban Development Mohammad Yusof Pashtun Yes 
25 Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Rangin Spanta Yes 
Source: Afghanistan National Assembly, General Secretariat of Wolesi Jirag (House of Representatives). 
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Out of 25 nominees that were introduce to the Wolesi Jirag, as it is showed in table 
4.2.2.1, 20 nominees at the Wolesi Jirga’s May 2 session succeeded to get the legislators’ 
confidence vote and 5 nominees were rejected. After the Wolesi Jirga gave vote no 
confidence to the five nominees in the first list, a list of 5 new nominees was introduced 
by President Hamid Karzai to the Wolesi Jirga which all of the 5 new nominees was able 
to win the legislators’ confidence vote and thus became minister, see table 4.2.2.3. 
 
 
Source: Afghanistan’National Assembly, General Secretariat of Wolesi Jirga ( House of Representatives) 
If we calculate only the first list of ministerial nominees which on that five nominate 
minster failed to receive the MPs vote of confidence, we can see that, President Hamid 
Karzai was still able to secure the approval of 80 percent of his ministerial candidates 
which was proposed to the Wolesi Jirga in 2006 during his first presidency. 
As for his second term, his cabinet consisted of 24 ministries and in 2 January of 2010 he 
introduced a list of 24 ministerial nominees to the Wlesi Jirga for their approval. 
However, out of 24 ministerial nominees, Wolesi Jirga approved only 7 nominees and 
rejected 17 others, see Table 4.2.2.3. 
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Table 4.2.2.3 President Karzai’s list of nominated ministers proposed to the National Assembly in Jan 2nd,  
2010 
# Ministries Nominies Ministers Approved 
1 Minister of Interior Mohamamd Hanif Atmar Yes 
2 Minister of National Defense Mohamamd Rahim Wardak Yes 
3 Minister of Commerce and Industries Ghulam Mohammad Eelaqi No 
4 Minister of Finance Omar Zakhilwal Yes 
5 Minister of Education Farooq Wadak Yes 
6 Minister of Higher Education Obaidullah Obaid No 
7 Minister of Information and Culture Sayed Makhdum Rahin Yes 
8 Minister of Hajj and Islamic Affairs Enayatullah Baligh No 
9 Minister of Justice Sarwar Danish No 
10 Minister of Transport and Aviation Mohammadullah Batash No 
11 Minister of Mines Waheedullah Sharani Yes 
12 Minister of Energy and Water Mohammad Ismael Khan No 
13 Minister of Agriculture Mohammad Asef Rahimi No 
14 Minister of Counter Narcotics Gen. Khudaidad No 
15 Minister of Border and Tribal Affairs Sayed Hamid Gilani No 
16 Minister of Returnees and Refugees Enayatullah Nazari No 
17 Minister of Public Health Mohammad Amin Fatimi No 
18 Minister of Public Welfare Engineer Mirza Hussain Abdullahi No 
19 Minister of Economy Anwar ul Haq Ahadi No 
20 
Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development 
Wais Ahmad Barmak 
No 
21 
Minister of Telecommunication and 
Information Technology 
Amirzai Sangin 
No 
22 Minister of Women Affairs Husn Banu Ghazanfar No 
23 
Minister of Work, Social Affairs, 
Martyred, and Disabled 
Mohammad Esmail Monshi 
No 
Source: Afghanistan National Assembly, General Secretariat of Wolesi Jirga (House of Representatives). 
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The legislators’ vote of no-confidence to the President Hamid Karzai’s 17 ministerial 
nominees in 2010 simply illustrates that the degree of legislators’ support to President 
Hamid Karzai has extremely dropped compared to his first presidency. As it shows in 
figure 4.2.2.1, during his first presidency, President Hamid Karzai was able to secure the 
approval of 80 percent of his cabinet members which means that he had the majority’s 
support within the Wolesi Jirga. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In contrary, in the second presidency, the degree of legislators’ support of the president 
shows a huge decline so as to President Hamid Karzai could only secure the legislators’ 
approval of 26 percent of his nominated cabinet members.  
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In sum, the above analysis of both parliamentary procedures, legislative support of the 
president initiatives and legislators’ confidence vote for ministerial nominees offers that; 
during President Hamid Karzai first government, the executive-legislative relation 
relatively was based on consensus, and compromise, particularly in the fist three years. 
The analysis showed that in general President Hamid Karzai was successful in 
marshalling legislative’s support. However, a variation on the degree of legislative’s 
support of President Hamid Karzai was apparent so as to in the first three years of his 
presidency, legislators supported him hundred percent, as all of his initiatives passed and 
became law, as well as 80 percent of his cabinet’s nominees got the approval of Wolesi 
Jirga and became ministers. But, the last two years showed a decrease in legislators’ 
support, as President Hamid Karzai was facing several defeats and he was able only to 
secure the passage of 20 percent of his initiatives during his last year in office.  
 
In fact, the reason why there was variation on the degree of legislators’ support of 
President Hamid Karzai’s initiatives can be found in the inconsistent sources that he used 
to generate support within the legislature. As it is mentioned before that President Hamid 
Karzai lacked the Paritsan sources of power and thus he did not have his own political 
party which could control the majority or close to majority’s seats within the legislature 
and thus became a consistent sources of support to him. Instead, he was totally rely on 
other sources such as; Coalition building (distribution of cabinet posts to ethnic a political 
groups), distribution of patronage (or MPs material benefits) and benefiting from the 
country’s crisis situation (Taliban insurgencies and the fear of Taliban re-empowerment). 
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These factors were effective to a great extent and did help President Hamid Karzai 
generating legislators’ support.  
 
In the following chapter the abovementioned factors have been analyzed (which I believe 
that they were the most influential factors drawing legislators’ support for President 
Hamid Karzai’s legislative initiatives during his first presidency) in detail. And thus, 
these factors had great deal of impact on the executive-legislative relation as well as on 
the legislators’ behaviors.  
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Chapter 5: Factors Inducing Legislators’ Support of President 
Initiatives 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Throughout this chapter a detailed analysis of the, somehow, interlinked factors such as; 
Coalition building, the factor of Crisis situation (Taliban insurgencies and the fear of 
Taliban re-empowerment), and the MPs Material benefits has been undertaken. 
Analyzing these factors, the chapter generally aimed at showing; in the absence of 
President’s Partisan power, the abovementioned factors, particularly the factor of 
coalition building, were the utmost effective factors drawing legislators’ support for the 
president’s initiatives within the national assembly. In this chapter, the factor of coalition 
building has been treated as the main and most significant variable and crisis situation 
along with MPs material benefits are considered less significant variables, however 
effective in generating legislators’ support for the president. 
 
The first section of chapter five has been allocated for the analysis of the factor of 
coalition building. Studying the politics of coalition building in the context of President 
Karzai’s first government, the main focus has been put on the cabinet coalition building 
aspects of coalition building. Therefore throughout the first section, it has been sought to 
analyze how cabinet posts are distributed to the major ethno-political groups and thus 
 65 
how a multi-party cabinet had an impact on the legislative behavior. To measure such 
impact, the composition of President Hamid Karzai’s cabinet, before and after its change 
has been analyzed. As a finding, the section has offered the argument that; coalition 
building through the distribution of ministerial portfolios to major ethno-political groups 
was an effective strategy enabling President Hamid Karzai to, while lacking a Partisan 
power, successfully cobble together majorities within the Wolesi Jirga to support his 
legislative initiatives during early years of his government. The accuracy of this argument 
has been proved by the result of the data, showing that while there were no changes on 
the formerly distributed cabinet posts; President Hamid Karzai was enjoying an absolute 
majority’s support; however the situation has changed when there was change on the 
composition of his cabinet. The degree of legislators’ support dropped increasingly when 
President Hmid Karzai replaced some of his ministers from key ministries. Thus, this 
section has illustrated that how changes in the cabinet affected the legislative behavior. 
 
In the second section of chapter five, the factor of crisis situation has been analyzed to 
see the impact of military crisis (Taliban insurgencies and re-empowerment), that county 
was facing with, on the legislative behavior as well as parliament support of President 
Hamid Karzai. The section has raised the argument, which came out of the analysis of 
available data, that the existence of perceived threat caused by the continuation of 
Taliban insurgencies and re-empowerment had strong influence on the executive, 
legislative relation during President Hamid Karzai’s first government. The ideological 
opposition of a large number of MPs with the Taliban ideology and thus the fear of 
Taliban returning to the power, created incentives for the majority of the legislators to 
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support President Karzai while voting over the important issues within the Wolesi Jirga. 
The argument in this section was supported by the author’s conducted interviews as well 
as major Medias’ interviews with the MPs in Afghan national assembly. 
 
The third and the last section in this chapter have contained the analysis of the factor of 
MPs material benefits. Throughout this section, the efforts have been paid to explain the 
correlation between MPs material benefits and their legislative behavior. It has been 
shown in this section that besides the aforementioned factors, economic incentives played 
also a major role in accumulating support for the president’s legislative initiatives. The 
central argument in this section is that; the success of President Hamid Karzai in being 
dominant in legislation process, in comparison to the Wolesi Jirga, during his last two 
years in office was heavily hinge on the distribution of patronage and material benefits 
which enabled him to attract the support within the Wolesi Jirga, particularly among the 
independent MPs.  
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5.2. Cabinet Coalition Building 
 
The central feature of the pure presidential government’s constitutional system is the 
horizontal fragmentation of power encapsulated by the phrases “separation of power’ and 
“checks and balances.” This means that, in order to legislate, the president must build 
coalition in Congress because he can not act without Congress’s consent. Particularly, 
when there is a minority government in which the president does not have a constant 
majorities’ support, hence coalition building is inevitable to avoid political deadlocks.    
 Therefore one of the strategies that a minority president can use to overcome a deadlock 
situation and to obtain support within the assembly is cabinet coalition building. A 
minority president can distribute the cabinet posts to political parties to seal a formal 
alliance with other parties in the assembly. The study of coalition-building in presidential 
regimes has shown that it is possible for a president to build, just like a prime minister, an 
often multiparty cabinet coalition to overcome the weak status of his party in the 
assembly. Therefore, if the cabinet is consists of members of political parties that 
communally direct a majority of seats in the legislature, then there is strong possibility 
that the government’s proposals achieve majority support in congress even if the 
president’s party alone has only a minority legislative status [ Negretto. 2006:37].  
 
Although, some scholars have doubt on the formation of durable coalition in presidential 
system and have stated that presidentialism does not give incentives to political parties to 
collaborate with the government. Their arguments rests on the notion that; mutual 
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independence (the independent electoral sources of executive and legislative) is the 
essence of presidentialism and thus, it always encourages the emergence of minority 
government and discourages the formation of durable coalition [ Stepan and Skach. 1993: 
17]. Also, it argued that combination of multi-party system and presidentialism makes it 
difficult for the emergence of a coalition government. In a highly fragmented multi-party 
system, no party can control majority or close to a majority, therefore this situation makes 
it hard for a president to build reliable governing coalition [Mainwaring and Shugart. 
1997: 394]. These can be true with the formation of coalition governance, which requires 
a broader binding agreement between political parties [Laver and Schofield. 1990:130]. 
But it is not true with the coalition cabinet, which only needs political parties’ agreement 
over cabinet appointments, in a presidential system [Neto.2002:51]. 
 
The case of Afghanistan’s first democratically elected presidential government 
demonstrates well the pattern of cabinet coalition building aspects of coalition building. 
President Hamid Karzai broadly used the strategy of distributing the ministerial portfolios 
to the different ethno-political groups to cement coalition and thus secure the majority’s 
support within the Afghan national assembly. Giving an important role to the strategy of 
cabinet coalition building, while analyzing the executive, legislative relation in President 
Hamid Karzai’s first government, the principle argument raises here is that; in the 
absence of Partisan and, an upper hand, constitutional power it was the strategy of 
cabinet coalition building that enabled the President to marshal majority of legislators’ 
support and thus secure the passage of most of his legislative initiatives. 
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 It has been mentioned before that cabinet coalition building needs political parties’ 
agreement over cabinet appointments. However, one may question that how we can 
understand that an agreement was actually struck when President Hamid Karzai’s cabinet 
was coalitional and based on the distribution of ministerial portfolios to political groups, 
and was not simply based on cooption strategy? 
 
Amorim Neto [2002] has mentioned that we can overcome the problem of finding out 
about political parties’ agreement over the formation cabinet by making plausible 
assumptions about what constitutes an agreement over cabinet formation. In this regard, 
we can rely on the basic information available on cabinet ministers, namely, their party 
affiliation, appointment and dismissal dates, and legislative weight of their parties. 
According to him, “if a president and more than one party reaches a coalition agreement 
over the composition of the cabinet, the parties receive ministerial portfolios in a measure 
that is roughly proportional to their legislative weight”[Amorin Neto.2002:52].  
 
 Thus, in the following sub sections, based on the Amorin Neto’s guidance, we first try to 
explain how the President Hamid Karza’s first cabinet was a coalitional cabinet, and in 
order to do so, detailed information about the ministers and their ethnic and political 
affiliation, as well as the legislative weight of those ethno-political groups involved in 
coalition will be given in the first sub section. Then, through the second sub section it 
will be explained how the coalitional cabinet had an impact on the executive-legislative 
relation, enabling President Hamid Karzai to influence the assembly and successfully 
garner majority’s support. 
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5.2.1. Coalitional Cabinet, Ethnic and Political affiliation of the Ministers, 
and Legislative Weight of Political Parties 
 
Building coalition through distributing cabinet posts was one of President Karzai’s main 
strategies since he was appointed as head of the Interim Authority after the collapse of 
the Taliban regime in 2001. He continued such a strategy during his Transitional 
Government as well as after being elected in 2004 as the president of the first Afghan 
elected presidential government. 
 
In fact, since President Hamid Karzai did not have his own political party to become a 
sources’ of support for him and thus he was an independent candidate for presidency, the 
necessity of forming a coalition was inevitable for him governing in Afghanistan, in a 
country with diverse ethnic, linguistic and religious groups, with a political system in 
which political power is fragmented vertically and horizontally. Therefore, President 
Hamid Karzai resorted to the strategy of forming a coalition in order to compensate the 
lack of his Partisan power in dealing with the national assembly.  
 
 To talk of coalition building in the context of Afghanistan’s first presidential government, 
it is necessary to mention here that; in some aspects the cabinet coalition strategy which 
President Karzai used during his first presidency was different and had a specific 
characteristic which, to some extent, differentiates it from other cabinet coalition building 
under the Presidential regimes. In most of the cases of cabinet coalition building, in order 
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to build a more reliable coalition, Presidents are trying to distribute the cabinet posts to 
the political parties, who have a large share of seats within the assembly. But in the case 
of Afghanistan, for the President Hamid Karzai not only the legislative weight of the 
political groups itself was important; but also the ethnic affiliation of the proposed 
ministers by those political groups was a key factor to the building of a reliable coalition. 
This was more because of the dominance of the ethnic politics in Afghan political culture 
which has roots in demographic structure of Afghan societies. 
 
Table 5.2.1 shows the list and composition of President Hamid Karzai’s first cabinet 
approved by Wolesi Jirga in 2006. The table demonstrates the ethnic as well as political 
affiliation of President Hamid Karzai’s voice presidents and cabinet ministers. 
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Table 5..2.1 Composition of 2006 Cabinet and Ethnic and Political affiliation of the Ministers 
Table 5.2.1 Composition of 2006 Cabinet and Ethnic and Political affiliation of the Ministers 
# Ministries              Minsters Ethnicity  political affiliation 
1 First Voice President Ahmad Zia Masood Tajik Jamiat Islami 
2 Second Voice President Abdul Karim Khalili Hazara Wahdat party 
3 Minister of Interior Zarar Ahmad Moqbel Tajik Jamiat Islami 
4 Minister of National Defense Mohamamd Rahim Wardak Pashtun Mahaz Mili 
5 Minister of Commerce and Industries Mohammad Amin Farhang Pashtun   
6 Minister of Finance Anwar-ul Haq Ahadi Pashtun Afghan Milat 
7 Minister of Education Mohamamd Hanif Atmar Pashtun Khalq Party 
8 Minister of Higher Education Dr. Mohammad Azam Dadfar Uzbek Junbish mili 
9 Minister of Information and Culture Karim Khoram Pashtun Hezbe Islami 
10 Minister of Haj and Islamic Affairs Nematullah Shahrani Uzbek Adalat party 
11 Minister of Justice  Mohammad Sarwar Danish Hazara Wahdat party 
12 Minister of Transport and Aviation Nematullah Ehsan Jawid Hazara   
13 Minister of Mines Ibrahim Adel Hazara Wahdat party 
14 Minister of Energy and Water Mohammad Ismael Khan  Tajik Jamiat Islami 
15 Minister of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock Obidullah Ramin Tajik   
16 Minister of Counter Narcotics Habibullah Qaderi Pashtun   
17 Minister of Border and Tribal Affairs Abdul Karim Barahawi Baluch Jamiat Islami 
18 Minister of Returnees and Refugees Shir Mohammad Etebari Pashtun Etehad Islami 
19 Minister of Public Health Mohammad Amin Fatimi Pashtun Jabha-e-Nejat Mili 
20 Minister of Public Welfare Sohrab Ali Safari Hazara Wahdat party 
21 Minister of Economy Dr. Mohammad Jalil Shams Tajik Jamiat Islami 
22 Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development Mohammad Ehsan Zia Pashtun   
23 Minister of Communication Amir Zai Sangeen Pashtun   
24 Minister of Women Affairs Husn Bano Ghazanfar Uzbek Junbish mili 
25 Minister of Work, Social Affairs, Martyred, and Disabled Noor Mohammad Qarqeen Turkman   
26 Minister Of Urban Development Mohammad Yusof Pashtun Pashtun   
27 Minster of Foreign Affairs Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta Tajik   
Source: Gerneral Secretariat of president office 
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According to the data presented in the table, out of 27 posts (25 ministers and 2 voice 
president posts), 17 posts which shows clear political affiliation of the ministers, had 
distributed to the different political groups. The other 10 cabinet posts, though, do not 
show any political affiliation of designated ministers but still, as it is mentioned by Mr. 
Alimi Balkhi,17 they were distributed based on an ethnic calculation and some of those 
ministers were introduced to the President by those ethno-political groups, even though 
those ministers were not official members of those parties. 
 Though, the representatives of nine political parties in the President Hamid Karzai 
cabinet reveals, to some extent, on the fact that his cabinet was a coalitional cabinet, 
however, it can be further proved by showing a clear relation between the legislative 
weights of those political parties in coalition and the number of cabinet post which they 
received.  
                                                
17- Kabul city’s representative to the Wolesi jirga (House of Representatives) and also a member of 
Wahdat-e- Islami party. Interviewed by author in 2009/ 8/ 13, Kabul, Wolesi Jirga. 
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Figure 5.2.1 the legislative weight of political parties who has received cabinet 
posts
 
Sources: Afghanistan National assembly’s General secretariat 
 
The figure 5.2.1 shows the legislative weight of those nine political parties which have 
received cabinet posts during President Hamid Karzai’s first government. The column 
named others demonstrates the percentage of the seats in Wolesi Jirga occupied by the 
Independent MPs as well as other political parties, who did not receive any post in 
President Hamid Karzai’s cabinet. According to the NDI (National Democratic Institute) 
there were around 93 independent MPs and around 25 political parties having seats in 
Wolesi Jirga. Out of 25 parties, 15 are pre-Taliban political parties and remaining 10 are 
post-Taliban parties. The percentages of seats occupied by pre-Taliban political parties’ 
reaches to 93-123, and of post-Taliban parties estimated to be 19-31[NDI.2006: 7]. Thus, 
based on such estimation, the pre-Taliban political parties are more influential in the 
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Wolesi Jirga. Indeed, this matches with the fact that; almost all of those political parties 
that have received cabinet posts, in President Hamid Karzai’s first government, was pre-
Taliban political parties. As it shows in figure 5.2.1 and chart 5.2.1, the dominant Tajik 
ethnic of Jamiat-e-Islami party and the dominant Hazara ethnic of Wahdat-e-Islami party 
has a higher share of seats in Wolesi Jirga, and thus they had also higher number of 
cabinet posts (5 posts Jamiat-e-Islami and 4 posts Wahdat-e-Islami18) than other political 
groups. However, apparently a contradiction occurred between the degree of legislative 
weight and the number of cabinet posts that the Uzbek nationalist party of Junbesh-e-
Milli Islami and the Hezbe Islami party received. 
                                                
18 - For the purpose of this study, we caounted all factions of  Wahdat-e- Islami party as one party of 
Wahdat-e-Islami. The same with Jamiat-e- Islami.  
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Chart 5.2.1 
 
Source: General Secretariat of Afghanistan’s Presidential office 
 
The first with a lower legislative weight received more cabinet posts than the second with 
its higher legislative weight has received. In fact, this imbalances between the legislative 
share of seats and the number cabinet posts which these political parties have received, 
shows the specific pattern of cabinet coalition building that President Hamid Karzai used 
during his first presidency. As, it is mentioned before that while building cabinet 
coalition, President Hamid Karzai not only considered the political make up of his 
cabinet but, in a more broader range, he also considered the ethnic make up of the cabinet. 
If we see the ethnic composition of his cabinet in table 5.2.1 and see the ethnic 
composition of the Wolesi jirga or House of Representatives in figure 5.2.2, we will find 
a clear correlation between the legislative weights of ethnic groups and the number of 
cabinet posts which distributed to the each ethnic group, through their agents which are 
those political parties. As, it is apparent in both table 5.2.1 and figure 5.2.2, four ethnic 
groups Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek have a higher share of cabinet posts as well as 
legislative seats. 
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Figure 5.2.2 The Ethnic groups’ Share of Seats in Wolesi Jirga 
 
Source: Asian Report # 16 
 
Therefore, it becomes understandable that it was based on such calculation that the Uzbek 
nationalist party of Junbesh-e-Milli got a share of cabinet posts which did not match with 
its legislative weight, but in contrary, the ethnic Pashtun dominant party of Hezbe Islami 
with roughly higher legislative weight than the Junbesh-e-Milli party, has got less cabinet 
posts. In fact, this is mainly because of the highest number of cabinet posts that Pashtuns 
already had in the cabinet, which reached 11. So, President Hamid Karzai could not 
change the balances between the four major ethnic groups and thus did not give more 
cabinet post to the Pashtun political groups such as Hezbe Islami. What the above 
mentioned fact suggests is; that building coalition, President Hamid Karzai had come to 
an agreement over the formation of his cabinet, mainly with those three political groups 
representing three major none-Pahstun groups such as; Tajiks represented by jamiat-e-
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Islami party, Hazaras represented by the Wahdat-e-Islami party, and Uzbeks represented 
by the Junbesh-e-Milli party. In fact, President Hamid Karzai did distribute his cabinet 
posts to each groups based on the compromise with the leaders of above mentioned 
ethno-political parties. As, a public speech of Haji Mohammad Mohaqqiq to Hazara 
people19, during the campaign for President Hamid Karzai second presidency in northern 
province of Mazar-e-Sharif reveals further on the fact; “he said to the Hazara people that 
we came to an agreement with President Hamid Karzai for a more five years and we will 
have our share in the government based on our agreement” [Kabulpress news article, 13 
January, 2010].  
 
Meanwhile, the members of these three none-Pashtun ethno-political groups, who were 
MPs as well, formed another political group in 2007 called United National Front 
“ Jabhe-Motahed-e-Milli” which was led by former Afghan President Burhan-u-din 
Rabani and Wolesi Jirga’s head Mr. Yunus Qanooni [Keneth Katzman. 2007, p.5]. They 
were recognized as a major parliamentary opposition group, but they themselves never 
officially stated so.   
 
In sum, the analysis of ethnic and political affiliation of the ministers and the legislative 
weights of the political parties and their share of cabinet posts, has clearly illustrated that; 
President Hamid Karzai first cabinet was a coalitional cabinet, and he built that coalition 
based on ethnic as well as political pillars. What this implies is that; it was not only a 
political coalition but it also was a cross-ethnic coalition.  By such calculation, President 
                                                
19 - One of the leaders of Wahdat-e-Islami party and one of the Kabul city’s representatives to the Wolesi 
Jirga or House of Representatives. 
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Hamid Karzai’s cabinet was entirely a coalitional cabinet, because none of his ministers 
was non-partisan in a sense that; they either belonged to a political party or belonged to 
one of those four major ethnic groups who were dominating the national assembly as well. 
As it is mentioned also by Mr. Nader Nadery20, “even those of the ministers who were 
not an official member of any of those political parties in coalition with President Hamid 
Karzai, still they were introduced to the President through those powerful ethno- political 
groups[ Author’s interview, 2009].    
 
Thus, through the following section the analysis of the impact of cabinet coalition 
building on the executive, legislative relation during President Hamid Karazai first 
presidency has been undertaken. To measure such impact, the President Hamid Karzai 
first cabinet has been analyzed in two parts, first before the occurrence of change on the 
composition of cabinet and the second, after the changes happened and some of the 
ministers were replaced.        
 
 5.2.2. The Impact of Coalitional Cabinet on the Executive – Legislative 
Relation 
 
One of the main arguments which have been raised in this dissertation was; in the 
absence of President’s Partisan power, it was the factor of cabinet coalition building 
which has had, to some extent, an impact, shaping a cooperative based executive, 
                                                
20 - One of the participants in 2001 Bonn conference and a prominent Afghan human wright’s activist 
currently serves as high commissioner of the Afghanistan’s Independent Human wrights Organization.  
 80 
legislative relation, and thus enabling President Hamid Karzai to marshal legislators’ 
support to secure the passage of his legislative proposals. 
 
In order to measure the impact of President Hamid Karzai’s coalitional cabinet on the 
executive-legislative relation in general and in particular on the legislators’ behavior 
during his first government, we need to have an analytical view of the records of floor 
voting on the President legislative proposals. Floor voting is one of the key legislative 
arenas in which coalitional behavior of the legislators can be readily observed, it is 
because the decisions which came out of it, in fact express the assembly’s last word. In 
another word, assembly’s floor is the best arena, where we can precisely see the degree to 
which coalition agreements over cabinet composition are binding on legislative parties 
[Neto. 2002: 60]. 
 
To analyze the records of floor voting on the President Hamid Karzai legislative 
proposals, we start with observing the records of each year’s passed as well as defeated 
legislative bills initiated by the President. Doing so we start with the year 2006, although 
the national assembly in Afghanistan inaugurated in 2005 but on that year President 
Hamid Karzai’s cabinet was the cabinet from his Transitional government. He introduced 
his new cabinet to the national assembly for their confidence vote in 2006; so, the aim of 
this analysis is the President Hamid Karzai’s elected government’s cabinet which is the 
2006 cabinet. 
 81 
 
 
Source: Afghanistan’s National assembly, Wolesi Jirga’s Research Services Center 
 
According to the data showed in table 5.2.2.1, in 2006, which is the year that the 
coalitional cabinet was formed, 6 bills were initiated by the president and all of the 6 bills 
had passed without facing any defeat. The same situation can be seen in the year 2007; a 
total number of 29 proposed bills had passed, and shows no defeat. What the results of 
the data are showing is that President Hamid Karzai was totally successful in dealing with 
the Wolesi Jirga, and Wolesi Jirga was quite cooperative with him so as to an absolute 
majorities’ of the legislators had supported him by backing his proposed bills during the 
floor voting sessions. This means that President Hamid Karzai’s strategy of cabinet 
coalition building had a great impact on the executive, legislative relation during his 
government. And hence legislators who were the members of those political parties in 
coalition and those who had not political ties but still had an ethnic tie with those political 
parties, behaved in a coalitional manner and offered their support to the president. 
Otherwise, it was impossible for President Hamid Karzai to garner majorities’ support 
while lacking a strong partisan power. As it has been stated by one of the independent 
MP, Ahmad Behzad21 “the success of President Hamid Karzai in getting his proposed 
bills passed by Wolesi Jirga, was highly hinged on the supports of those Mujahedeen 
                                                
21 - Herat province’s representative to the Wolesi Jirga. 
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groups which are very influential and have the entire control of the Wolesi Jirga, that is 
why he attempted to distribute many of his cabinet posts to those Mujahedeen related 
political parties”22.  
 
For the further measurement of the impact of cabinet coalition, we might need to refer 
back to table 5.2.2.1, the years 2006 and 2007 showed that President Hamid Karzai was 
hundred percent successful in generating legislators’ support. However, the two 
following years of 2008 and 2009 shows a decrease on the degree of legislators’ support 
to the President so as to in year 2008, out of 47 bills initiated by President Hamid Karzai 
40 were passed and became law but 7 was failed and defeated by Wolesi Jirga. Also, in 
the year 2009, out of 15 initiated bills only 3 became law and remaining 13 faced defeats. 
Despite a decrease on the level of legislators’ support to President Hamid Karzai, as he 
was facing some defeats, President Karzai was still successful in legislating more bills in 
compare to the Wolesi Jirga, see table (4.2). 
 
 But, the reason for the change in the level of legislators’ support of President Hamid 
Karzai’s legislative initiatives from (See figure 5.2.2.1) 100% in 2006 and 2007 to 80% 
in 2008 and 20% in 2009 was as such; during the years 2006 and 2007, there was no any  
                                                
22 - Author’s interview with Mr. Ahmad Behzad, Kabul, Wolesi Jirga, 2009/ 8/8. 
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Source: Afghanistan’ National Assembly, Research Services Center 
 
 
Changes on the composition of cabinet and the parties in coalition were holding the same 
ministries as they received them based on their earlier agreement with the President. 
However, in the year of 2008, the cabinet undergone some changes as President Hamid 
Karzai attempted to replace as well as dismiss some of his cabinet ministers and appoint 
new one. Not all of the changes which President Hamid Karzai had brought to his cabinet 
had equal value triggering the reactions of his coalition’s partners. For instance, he 
dismissed one of the ministers who was from Hazara ethnic group and backed by 
Wahdat-e-Islami party but in the same time he appointed another minster, who also was 
Hazara and introduced by the same party.23 Or some of the changes was related to the 
less important ministries and were not changing the coalition partners’ balance of power 
within the cabinet, therefore, considered not very significant by the coalition’s partners. 
                                                
23 - In 2008, President Hamid Karzai dismissed Nehmatullah Ehsan Jawid, minister of Transportation and 
Aviation backed by Wahdat-e-Islami party but in order to not dissatisfy Wahdat-e-Islami party, he 
appointed General Khoda dad as a minister of Anti-narcotic ministry, which he also introduced and backed 
by Wahdat-e-Islami party.  
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However, there was one significant change which was hurting the balance of power 
within the cabinet and thus induced, to some extent, the dissatisfaction of President’s 
coalitional partners which also had an impact on the executive, legislative relation. In the 
same year of 2008, President Hamid Karzai dismissed the minister of a key ministry of 
Interior, Mr. Zarar Ahmad Moqbel, who was Tajik and belongs to the Jamiat-e-Islami 
party; instead, he brought a Pashtun by ethnic, Mohammad Hanif Atmar to head the key 
ministry of Interior. Before being appointed as minister of the Interior ministry, 
Mohammad Hanif Atmar was the minister of the Education ministry. So, when he 
became in charge of the Interior ministry, President Hamid Karzai appointed Mr. Faroq 
Wardak, as minister of the Education ministry. The later was former Hezbe- Islami, a 
Pashtun. 
 
By two following reasons, the change on the composition of cabinet, taking the control of 
the Interior Ministry from Tajiks and giving it to the Pashtuns had an impact on the 
executive-legislative relation and had been causing changes on the level legislators 
support to the President’s legislative initiatives.  
 
First: In cabinet coalition building, not only the number of cabinet post that each political 
party receives is important but also the kind of cabinet posts is important too and is one 
of the main parts of bargaining in the building of a cabinet coalition. It is because that, 
not all cabinet posts are of equal value, depending on the countries situation, some 
cabinet posts are more important than others [Neto.2002:54]. For example; in the case of 
Afghanistan which is a country with decade’s experience of ethnic and religious conflicts, 
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the ministries such as Defense, Interior and Finance are more important than other 
ministries, such as Transport, Agriculture and so on. Therefore, when President Hamid 
Karzai replaced the Tajik minister of Interior Ministry with a Pashtun minister, it brought 
dissatisfaction in the side of Tajik’s political parties, particularly Jamiat-e-Islami which 
in part had impact on the coalitional behaviors those MPs, who were also members of  
the Jamiat-e-Islami party. 
 
Second: loosing the key ministry of Interior, did bring dissatisfaction not only to the Tajik 
political leaders, but also to the other politicians from Hazara and Uzbek groups. It is 
because that the key Ministry of Interior belonged to the none-Pashtuns went to the 
Pashtuns, who already had the control of two other key ministries of Defense and 
Finance. The change also brought an increase in the number of cabinet post which 
belonged to the Pashtuns from 11 to 12. It was as such, when Mohammad Hanif Atmar 
became Minister of Interior, his former ministry which was Education was filled by 
another Pashtun, Mohammad Farooq Wardak.  These, in fact changed the balance of the 
cabinet entirely in favor of the Pashtuns, which was not desirable at all for the non-
Pashtun groups. That is why, the National Front group, which was a coalition of three 
none-Pashtun political parties, had a reaction to the changes in cabinet, its spokesman 
Fazel Sngcharaki in his interview with BBC radio criticized such a change and called it 
ineffective move by the President Hamid Karzai [BBC radio.12th October 2008].  
 
Concluding this part, we may come to this point that coalition building through the 
distribution of cabinet’s posts to various ethno-political groups was an effective strategy 
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used by President Hamid Karzai to garner legislators’ support within the national 
assembly. And as the data showed there was a direct impact of cabinet coalition on the 
executive-legislative relation in general and in particular on the legislators’ behavior. 
Therefore, it was not just a coincidence that before the changes on the arrangements of 
the cabinet, President Hamid Karzai had hundred percent of legislators’ support, but after 
the change legislators’ support declined to some degree as some of his proposed bills 
were facing defeats. However, in some calculations, though the factor of cabinet coalition 
was effective but can not be the sole factor enabling President Hamid Karzai successfully 
generating legislators’ support. It is mainly because that; the coalition was too loose, due 
to the high number of political parties engaged in coalition, it did not cause a direct 
responsibility for each party to cooperate with the President. On the other hand, some of 
these political parties in coalition did not have a high legislative weight to influence 
decision-making within the Wolesi Jrga, in the way that could become a reliable source 
providing President Karzai with an absolute majority’ support. Thus, there should have 
been other factors at work which, in combination with the factor of cabinet coalition 
building had been enabling President Hmid Karzai to marshal an absolute majorities’ 
support, so as to all of his legislative initiatives successfully passed, particularly, during 
his early years in office.  
 
Therefore, in the following section the factor of crisis situation has been examined, which 
we assumed that this factor, besides the factor of coalition building, also had an impact 
on the executive-legislative relation. By crisis situation we generally mean the 
continuation of military crisis that the country has been facing since the collapse of the 
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Taliban regime in 2001. The continuation of Al-Qaeda’s terrorists attack and Taliban’s 
increasing insurgencies in many areas, in fact was threatening the general stability of the 
country. Therefore, the perception is that; such perceived threat had an impact on the 
legislators’ behaviors, and thus, made a large body of the MPS to become cooperative 
with the government, rather than to opposing it. Hence, the following section has offered 
a detailed analysis of how the factor of perceived threat had an impact on the legislators’ 
behaviors.      
 
5.3. The Factor of Crisis Situation 
 
Crisis situations, in some cases, can appear as a mechanism that can help avoiding 
political deadlock in the relationship between the executive and legislative branches, and 
can have an impact on the executive, legislative relation so as to, giving incentives to 
legislators to become cooperative with the executive.  
 
 It has been stated by some authors that, crises bestow on the president new power 
resources that can be employed to circumvent conflict situations. Crisis situations can be 
defined as many types: economic crises, military crises (engaging in war with other 
countries or facing rebellions or civil war), social unrest, and crises caused by natural 
disasters.   
 
 In the experience of Latin American presidential governments, there are some occasions 
in which a crisis situation generated support for the president. One of the examples is 
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Argentina in 1989, which was facing huge social unrest caused by the situation of 
hyperinflation. On that occasion legislators, including those from the opposition party, 
agreed on temporarily delegating full power to the executive through the Administrative 
Emergency Act and the Economic Emergency Act [Mustapic.2002:40]. As a result, the 
president of Argentina, Menem, could take advantage of a powerful array of economic, 
fiscal, and organizational powers with which to face the crises. Furthermore, he could 
also enjoy a period of time without feeling any threat from the assembly.    
  
To some extent, the positive effects of the Argentinean crisis can be seen in the 
Afghanistan’s case as well. We can see how the countries military crisis influenced 
decision making, as well as how it made an impact on shaping the relationship between 
the executive and legislative branches of government in the favor of President Hamid 
Karzai.                           
  
The government of President Hamid Karzai has been facing a military crisis since its 
establishment in 2004. The military crisis was caused by Al-qaeda’s frequent terrorist 
attacks as well as the Taliban’s constant insurgencies against the government. This in fact 
has generated a major threat, destabilizing the government in general, and even 
threatening its authority and control in some provinces. Actually, the destabilization of 
the government, or any other threat that could endanger the existence of president Hamid 
Karzai’s government and facilitating the return of Taliban to the power was not desirable 
for the major categories of legislators, including those from the opposition. 
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Figure 5.3.1, MPs who is against Taliban’s return 
 
Source: General secretariat of Wolesi Jirga (House of Representatives) 
 
Some of these categories of legislators were ideologically against the Taliban, such as the 
leftists and all of the female MPs, and some others like the former Mujahedeen were 
Taliban’s political rival, which had been fighting against them during the years 1994-
2001. As figure 5.2.1 shows the percentages of those MPs, who are against the return of 
the Taliban in power, is as high as ninety percent within the Wolesi Jirga. In a series of 
interviews conducted with the MPs from all of these categories within the Wolesi Jirga, 
almost all of them had been confirming that; the country’s fierce situation of insurgencies 
and war impacting, to a great extent, on the legislature decision making process. They 
further mentioned that, on many occasions, even though the legislators were not happy 
with President Karzai’s policies, but still they supported him within the legislature in 
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order to avoid the occurrence of any serious deadlock that could cause the breakdown of 
his government and accentuate the country’s political problems in favor of Taliban24. 
 
To find out, how the factor of perceived threat contributed to the mechanism of 
generating the legislator’s support of President? First of all, we have to see that the 
Taliban was a common enemy for President Hamid Karzai and most of those influential 
political groups or even, in a broader sense, majority of the MPs in Wolesi Jirag. 
Therefore, the existences of the common enemy constituted a common goal, for the 
government to fight it militarily and for the MPs to fight it by supporting President within 
the national assembly. 
 
In order to, clearly, see the correlation between the factor of military crisis or perceived 
threat of Taliban’s return to the power, and the legislators’ support of President 
legislative initiatives, we need to analyze the variation on the  President Hamid Karzai’s 
policies toward the Taliban during his first presidency. In the first following subsection, it 
will be explained how President Hmid Karzai’s firm anti- Taliban policy made an 
environment in which legislature became quite cooperative with the government, and in 
the second subsection it will be showing how the cooperative environment dominant on 
the relation between parliament and government changed, to some degree, when 
President Hamid Karzai’s policies toward Taliban got changed.  
                                                
24 - The interviews conducted by author in 2009/ 9/3. Kabul, Wolesi Jirga. A full list of the interviewed 
MPs can be found in the appendix 1.   
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5.3.1. President Hamid Karzai Anti-Taliban Policy 
 
One of the main commitments of President Hamid Karzai to the people of Afghanistan 
was to bring peace to the country by fighting and eliminating the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. 
His firm stance against Taliban group, who seemed to be entirely Pashtun ethnic with an 
extremist interpretation of Sunni Islam which was showing no compromise with none-
Pashtun groups, particularly with the followers of Shiite sect, was welcomed by almost 
the majority of the national assembly’s members. As it showed in figure 5.3.1, large 
categories of MPs within the Wolesi Jirga were against Taliban’s religious as well as its 
political ideology and thus were against their return to the power. Particularly, female 
MPs and those of MPs who were followers of the Shiite sect were totally against the 
Taliban’s harsh interpretation of Islam. For women, during the Taliban regime, they were 
banned from going to school or University as well as were not allowed to work outside of 
the house, and for the Shiite minority, they were not allowed to perform, publically, their 
religious ceremonies. Furthermore, the political ideology of Taliban was based on 
Pashtuns sole domination of power in the country, and thus they were not willing to share 
political power with other ethnic groups. Therefore, President Hamid Karzai’s firm 
stance against Taliban returns to the power became a common point which was binding 
both, President Karzai and those of MPs who were against the Taliban to cooperate with 
each others to reach such common goal. In fact, by reasons such as MPs ethnic, religious 
and ideological interests, the country’s military crisis (Taliban’s threat of returning to 
power) became one of the incentives mechanisms for the most of legislators, particularly 
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the female as well as those of none-Pashtun (Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks) MPs to support 
President Hamid Karzai’s legislative initiatives within the Wolesi Jirga.           
 
As, one of the MPs given example that ostensibly shows such a support to President is 
that25; there were two important issues raised during the first year of Parliament 
inauguration. Both were related to the military issues, one concerning the legalization of 
the foreign troops’ staying in Afghanistan and the creation of a fixed leaving time-table 
for them, and the second one was concerning about clarification of President Hamid 
Karzai’s military budget and spending. However, over both issues, President Hamid 
Karzai was not willing to touch or discuss them on that time, because clarifying his 
military spending to the Wolesi jirga, would have tight up his hands from spending freely 
more money on his military projects. Thus, President Hamid Karzai was avoiding talking 
on those issues with parliament, and since his military projects mainly aimed to fight Al-
Qaeda and the Taliban, the legislature went according to his will and thus gave up to raise 
the issues again. Thus, as the data witnesses, President Karzai, to a great extent, was 
benefiting from the existences of Taliban threat to the country’s general political stability. 
This was quite clear, particularly, during the years 2006 and 2007, which President 
Karzai had hundred percent successes in getting pass all of his legislative initiatives by 
Wolesi Jirga. Therefore, what can be understood is that the factor of perceived threat had 
impact on the executive, legislative relation and was inducing legislators’ support so as to, 
in some areas, legislature was giving to President Hamid Karzai huge freedom by not 
checking on him. 
                                                
25 - Mr. Jawadi is one of the representatives of  Bamyan province to the Wolesi Jirga. Interviewed in 
2009/8/ 15, Kabul , Wolesi Jirga. 
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5.3.2. Changes on the Policy of President Hamid Karzai towards Taliban 
 
The legislature’s full support to President Hamid Karzai was continuing parallel with his 
continuation of anti-Taliban policies. However, legislature’s support, to some degree, 
declined when there was a change in the policies of President Hamid Karzai’s toward the 
Taliban.  
From the end of 2004, after becoming the elected President of Afghanistan, until the end 
of the year 2007, President Hamid Karzai was showing a persistent anti-Taliban policy. 
Although, occasionally, he talked of negotiation and reconciliation with moderate Taliban 
(not with their leaders) but, in practice he was fighting and trying to eliminate them, 
without considering any serious reconciliation or political negotiation plan with the 
Taliban. But, in 2008, some changes occurred on the President Karzai’s policies towards 
the Taliban. For the first time in 2008, such a change was revealed by the British weekly 
news paper of Observer that; President Hamid Karzai has been started a secret 
negotiation with the Taliban by the mediation of Saudi Arab and Britain’s supports. 26. 
Though, at first the truth of such news was quickly disapproved by the Afghanistan 
Foreign minister Mr. Spanta however, it was later approved by President Hamid Karzai’s 
older brother Qayom Karzai that he had participated in a negotiation meeting with some 
of the Taliban members in Saudi Arab27. 
 
                                                
26 - BBC Persian online news article: Afghan government’s secret negotiation with Taliban, by Ramin 
Anwari, 28th Sept, 2008. 
27 - BBC Persian online news article, The confirmation of Qayoom Karzai meeting with the Taliban’s 
former member, 9th Oct, 2008. 
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With the confirmation of the news related to the President Hamid Karzai secret 
negotiation with the Taliban, there was a quick reaction by the Jabhe-Mottahed or 
National Front groups28. Its spokesman, Mr. Fazel Sangcharaki, in his interview with the 
Persian section of BBC radio; was criticizing such a plan by raising his doubt on the 
possibility of government’s negotiation and reconciliation program with the Taliban. He 
further said that the Taliban will never be ready for negotiation with the government29. 
The reaction against President Hamid Karzai’s policy of negotiation with Taliban was not 
limited to those of, apparently, opposition group but also some of his none-Pashtun 
official cabinet’s members, such as his foreign minister Mr. Spanta had reacted to it. In a 
seminar called “Peace and conflict resolution in Islamic thought” held in ministry of 
foreign affairs in Kabul, foreign minister Dr. Spanta, criticized the scheme of negotiation 
with Taliban and warned that this is a plan by some foreign countries to hand 
Afghanistan back to Taliban 30. 
 
In fact, the issue of negotiation with Taliban was, since the collapse of the Taliban regime, 
always politically a sensitive matter with the potential to provoke clashes between 
President Hamid Karzai and other powerful ethno- political groups. The non-Pashtun 
political leaders, particularly Tajik leaders, viewed President Hamid Karzai’s such move 
with suspicion believing that he was trying to promote his fellow Pashtuns within his 
                                                
28 - A coalesced group of the politician mainly from the Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek known as President 
Hamid Karzai’s dominant opposition group within the Wolesi Jirga. 
29 - BBC Persian online news article: The reaction Jabhe Milli ( National Front) group to the President 
Karzai’s policy of  negotiation with Taliban, by Neda Farhat, 10th Oct, 2008.  
30 - BBC online new article: Dr. Spanta’s disagreement with the negotiation with Taliban, By Neda Farhat, 
15th Oct, 2008. 
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government [ Johanson.2006:11].  Even President Hamid Karzai himself was aware of 
that fact, and that is why he was trying to have negotiation with Taliban quite secretly.                     
 
 Therefore, with the consideration of the fact that; ethnicity as well as religion was the 
dominant factors in the political culture of Afghans, and thus they had impact on the 
political behaviors of the politicians to the extent, that had been shaping the power 
relation in the country. Hence, the factor of Afghanistan’s military crisis which had direct 
links with the ethnic and religious issues obviously had an impact on the executive- 
legislative relation during President Hamid Karzai first presidency. And since the MPs 
were reacting, primarily, based on their ethnic and religious interests, President Hamid 
Karzai’s change of policies toward the Taliban caused him a decrease in the level of 
legislators’ supports within the Wolesi Jirga. Thus, based on the fact that MPs were 
behaving according to their own ethnic and religious interests, it can be said that 
President Hamid Karzai could enjoy enormous support of large categories of the 
legislators by showing a persistent anti-Taliban policy during the 2006 and 2007 years. 
Furthermore, the reaction of the politicians to the president Karzai change of policy 
towards the Taliban, improves more the importance and effectiveness of the use of crisis 
strategy in garnering legislators’ support. 
 
In sum, the analysis of both factors, cabinet coalition building and crisis situation in the 
context of President Hamid Karzai first government, has clarified how these factors had 
been impacting on the executive-legislative relation as well as on the MPs behaviors. In 
fact, both factors appeared to function as an incentive mechanism for the legislators and 
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had great deal of influences on the legislative decision making process. Such impact has 
been measured by testing the available data on the number of passed and defeated 
president’s legislative initiatives. As the results of the analyzed data was showing, the 
constant use of both factors by President Hamid Karzai during the years 2006 and 2007, 
enabled him to successfully garner the majority’s support to secure the passages of 
hundred percent of his legislative initiatives. However, when President Hamid Karzai 
brought some changes on the composition of his cabinet as well as changes in his policies 
towards the Taliban, as reaction to these changes the legislators, to some extent, 
decreased their support to him so as to President Hamid Karzai was facing several defeats, 
during the years 2008 and 2009. But, in comparison to the number of passed bill initiated 
by the Wolesi Jirga, still President Hamid Karzai was dominant in the legislation process, 
because he was initiating more bills than the legislature was doing.  
 
Thus, a question to be raised would be: why President Hamid Karzai was still successful 
initiating more bills despite a degree of discontents within the Wolesi Jirga towards his 
change of policies?  A possible answer to this question can be that; Firstly President 
Hamid Karzai’s change of policies did not discontent all the MPs identically; there were 
some groups within the Wolesi Jirga that were happy with the those changes. For 
example, when President Hamid Karzai was trying to negotiate with  the Taliban, though, 
such policy discontent, to a degree, the none-Pashtun MPs with the Wolesi Jirag but it 
was not the case with Pahstun MPs, or also when he dissatisfy the Tajiks with the change 
in the composition his cabinet but he kept satisfied, to some extent, the other groups like 
Hazara and Uzbek within his government. 
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Secondly; in order to not losing the entire MPs supports within the Wolesi Jirga, 
President Hamid Karzai broadly resorted to the use of other strategies such as; 
distribution of patronage or material benefits to the MPs, particularly, to the Independent 
MPs, who did not belong to those influential political parties. In fact, the distribution of 
material benefits to the MPs was a very effective tool that enabled President Hamid 
Karzai to keep motivating the MPs to support him within the Wolesi Jirga. 
 
In order to understand that how President Hamid Karzai employ such strategy, and how 
was the mechanism for the distribution of material benefits to the MPs, as well as to 
know how this factor influenced on the legislators’ behavior? The following section has 
been undertaken a detailed analysis of the factor of distribution of patronage.            
  
5.4. The Distribution of Patronage Strategy    
 
One of the main characteristics of today’s Afghan politics is the dominance of 
Clientelism which is in part the legacies of Afghanistan’s past conflicts and the resultant 
heightened role of ethnic politics which has continued to permeate the state’s formal 
political institutions. And in another part, it is due to the general weakness of the 
country’s current formal institutions to manage the ethno- pluralistic society of 
Afghanistan in a proper democratic manner. The new democratic institutions that have 
emerged in the country, since 2001, are not institutionalized yet and are too weak to fully 
perform the functions associated with their counterparts in the developed industrialized 
world that is, mobilization and representation. Even to some of these new institutions 
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such as political parties has not been given a formal role yet to regulate the political life 
of the Afghans on a democratic base31. Thus, the country’s system of governance, to a 
great extent (if not fully) run by patron-client relation, patrons offer resources to their 
clients in exchange for their loyalty, and clients support their patrons to access rewards 
that cannot be readily attained through a weak formal economy as well as institutions. In 
fact, ethnicity through dominating the Afghan’s politics has served good for the 
continuation and the survival of such system of governance by giving more incentives to 
the patron to build a wining coalition through distributing material benefits to the people 
who visibly share the same background or heritage. On the other side, people with low 
income have been motivated to be mobilized into ethnic blocs as a strategy for 
maximizing their chances of obtaining individualized benefits available from the state. 
   
Although, some of the scholars have viewed the distribution of patronage negatively 
saying that it will cause instability and lagging democratization [Leonardo R. Arriola. 
2009: 1344]. However, some other scholars have found positive points in it. It has been 
said that in a highly pluralistic societies, distribution of patronage as well as political pork 
may be the best instruments for building bridges across ethnic groups [Derick and Arthur 
A.Goldsmith, 2002: 20]. 
 
As the evidences are showing, there was some positive sign of the distribution of 
patronage strategies in the case of Afghanistan’s first presidential government as well. 
                                                
31 - For example, President Hamid Karzai signed a new electoral law in 2004 that was giving a passive role 
to the political parties in the way that, political parties were not allowed to formally introduce a candidate 
for the parliamentary election which held in 2005. Therefore, as a result candidates entered to the 
parliament independently and thus political parties lost their active role in the process, because most of 
those candidates now have less commitment to their own parties. 
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Using such strategy President Hamid Karzai was quite successful in bringing internal 
stability to his government by marshalling the majority’s support within the national 
assembly. By distributing patronage to a broader range of people from different ethnic 
groups, he was able not only to bring Pashtun MPs, but also MPs from other ethnic 
groups such as, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek and so on to his ally and enjoy their support. 
 
The mechanism that President Hamid Karzai was using for the distribution of patronage 
to the MPs, generally, was based on several ways, however, the most common way was 
the distribution of material benefits direct to an individual MP, or through a MP to a 
group of people which was the “Pork barrel” spending. In the following sub sections we 
illustrate on both ways by giving some of the examples of President Hamid Karzai’s use 
of the distribution of patronage strategy within the Afghan national assembly for the 
purpose of securing a working majority’s supports. 
 
5.4.1. Distribution of Material benefits to the Individual MP and the Pork 
barrel spending 
 
The distribution of material benefits to the individual MP and the pork barrel spending 
was one of the main strategies which have been broadly used by President Hamid Karzai 
in order to garner majority’s support and to secure the passage of his legislative proposals. 
Particularly, during the years 2008 and 2009, when the President Hamid Karzai’s change 
of policy towards the Taliban and changes in his cabinet composition generated a degree 
of legislators’ discontents, the distribution of material benefits to the MPs appeared to be 
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a very effective factor enabling the President to secure some degree of legislators’ 
support and thus remain still dominant in legislation. As, MPs from both opposition 
group (Miss. Fawzia Kofi) and pro-government group (Mr. Najibullah Kabully)32 was 
confirming the use of such strategy by President Hamid Karzai for getting the MPs 
support. They further mentioned that in the highly fragmented Wolesi Jirga where most 
of the MPs are acting independently, distributing material benefits to the MPs was quite 
an effective tool enabling the President to have always a degree of legislators’ support. 
 
There were several ways that MPs individually have been receiving material benefits 
form the government. A more common way was the MPs travels abroad either for 
personal purposes such as tourism and medical check-ups or treatments or for the official 
purposes such as the participation to the conferences and so on. As the data (government 
documents and some of the MPs assertions) is showing, issuing permission and paying 
for travel cost government was quite selective in the way that, some of the MPs have 
received travel permission but not any amount for traveling costs, however, for some 
others government covered their traveling cost and also they have been paid extra 
amounts as traveling allowances. Even for those of MPs who were going abroad for 
medical treatment, some have received relatively good amounts of money but some 
others were not paid at all, see some of the examples in table 5.4.1. 
 
Table 5.4.1 Amount of Money Paid to MPs for their Medical Treatment 
                                                
32 - Miss. Fawzia Kofi is one of the representatives of the Badakhshan province to the Wolesi jirga and she 
is belong to the President Hamid Karzai parliamentary opposition group. And Mr. Naibullah Kabully is the 
representative of Kabul city to the Wolesi Jirga and he is identified as member of  pro-government group. 
They both interviewed in Kabul on 10th Sept 2009, Wolesi Jirga.     
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Source: General Secretariat of Afghanistan’s Presidential Office 
 
The same situation can be observed on the MPs official overseas trips too; the 
government had been quite biased in paying extra amount of money to the MPs as of 
their travel allowances. As, Ms. Sheenkai Karokhil has asserted that33, “there was no a 
clear  process of MPs selection for the overseas official trip, anyone who has close 
connection with the government or is a member of those groups within the Wolesi Jirga 
which are receiving the government’s support can travel quite often. I have never been 
chosen by the Wolesi Jirga for any of those overseas official trips, unless I have received 
invitation letter with my name on it from other countries or organizations for 
participating in a conference or meetings. Even in the cases that I was invited to attend an 
overseas conference and meeting I have not been paid any amount as travel allowances 
by the government, however, there are some cases such as the case of Haji Fareed and 
other MPs, who were attending the NATO’s spring conference in late 2008, and have 
been paid by the government around 5,000 $ as a travel allowance”34. 
 
The government’s pork barrel spending can offer the same story of being used as a tool 
by the President for the purpose of generating legislators’ support. Generally, pork barrel 
                                                
33 - Ms. Sheenkai Karokhil  is one of the Kabul city’s representative to the Wolesi Jirga. 
34 -  8 Subh ,online news article by Amin Paiman, May 11, 2009  
 102 
spending is legal because it refers to publically funded projects ( building dams, highway 
construction, drilling deep well and so on) promoted by legislators to bring money and 
jobs to their own districts, as political favor to local politicians or citizens. However, it 
often allocated not on the basis of need or merit, but on the desire of legislators to curry 
local support. Therefore, the pork barrel spending can be used easily as a powerful 
instrument by the President to motivate legislators to support him; it is because that 
legislators also need to do something for their own districts, to keep satisfying the local 
people with his or her activities and thus to increase the chances of being reelected in the 
next election. As the evidences are showing such interaction between President Hamid 
Karzai and some of the legislators exist. In her proposals written in Oct. 2009 to the 
President office, Ms. Friba Ahmadi Kakar was demanding for the establishment of a 
center for treatment and training of drug addicted women as well as drilling deep wells 
for drinking water in her district in Qandahar province35. She had mentioned that when I 
was campaigning in my province for your Excellency’s second presidential election, I 
found that people there urgently need for those kin of projects to be done, therefore, I 
promised them to help them with those problems. President Hamid Karzai has signed her 
proposals and strongly ordered to the related ministries to urgently implement those 
needed project in Qandahar province36.       
  
In fact, what can be understood from the government’s unequal distribution of MPs 
overseas travel cost as well as travel allowances and geographically allocation of pork 
barrel spending is that; President Hamid Karzai was distributing such financial 
                                                
35 - Friba Ahmadi Kakar is one the Qandahar province representatives to the Wolesi Jirga. 
36 - Government official document collected from the general secretariat of presidential office 2009/9/7.  
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prerogatives only to those of MPs, who was part of his patron networks within the Wolesi 
Jirga. In turn, those MPs, who were receiving material benefits from the government, had 
been strongly supporting President Hamid Karzai. This was what some of the MPs were 
believed on. According to some of them, one of the reasons that Wolesi Jirga failed 
whenever wanted to impeach and give no confidence vote to President Hamid Karzai’s 
cabinet ministers was the exclusive supports of those MPs, who were receiving material 
benefits from the government. Particularly, it was quite evident in the case of minister of 
Culture and Information’s impeachment session. In 18th April 2009, Wolesi Jirga hold an 
impeachment session for Mr. Abdul Karim Khoram, minister of culture and information 
ministry, in that day out of 126 MPs present at the session 71 MPs were against his 
continuation in the office and gave no confidence vote, only 55 MPs gave him vote of 
confidence. However, due to some disagreement between MPs, the session was 
postponed for the 20th of April, which was two days later, but, surprisingly when the 
impeachment session resumed on the 20th of April, out of 123 MPs present at the session 
only 20 MPs gave vote of no confidence, and remaining 103 MPs gave him vote of 
confidence and thus he remained in the office37. 
 
As some of the MPs, such as Ms. Sheenkai Karokhil believed, the overnight change in 
the mind of MPs, ostensibly, illustrate the impact of President Hamid Karzai’s strategy of 
distributing material benefits to the MPs. It was due to such a reason that MPs quickly 
made change in their decisions to vote in favor of the Minister of Culture and 
information38. 
                                                
37 - BBC Persian news, 20th of April 2009 
38 - Ms. Sheenkai Karokhail interview 8th Oct 2008, with 8 Subh, online news paper. 
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In sum, what the result of the analyzed data on the three factors; cabinet coalition 
building, crisis situation or Taliban military threats, and distribution of patronage strategy 
showed is that; these factors had strong impact on the executive-legislative relation as 
well as legislators’ behavior. President Hamid Karzai used them as an effective 
instrument generating legislators’ support which he needed for the survival of his first 
government.   
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
This dissertation was a case study of presidentialism in the ethno-religiously divided 
society Afghanistan. It covered the analysis of Afghanistan’s first presidential 
government 2004-2009. Unlike the previous studies on presidentialism, which were 
based on the analysis of the presidential system in the at least partially homogenous 
societies of Latin America, this study has dealt with the analysis of presidentialism in a 
deeply ethno-linguistically fragmented society out of the Latin American region. Also the 
previous studies on presidentialism, mostly have focused on the analysis of the causes of 
executive-legislative conflict, institutional paralysis, and the breakdown of a presidential 
system. However, this study rather has offered an analysis of how a presidential 
government has survived without facing any of those problems which are believed to be 
associated presidentialism. 
 
The first chapter of the dissertation explained the reasons for the conducting study and 
introduced the research questions. The questions which constituted the bases for this 
study are:  
 
Why was President Hamid Karzai able to avoid serious confrontation with the legislature 
led by his opposition figure Yonus Qanoni? And; how could President Hamid Karzai 
gain legislators’ support in legislature housing none of his co-partisan?    
 
 106 
 The questions that arose with Afghanistan’s first presidential government reflect a puzzle 
which requests reconsideration of the relations between the theories and empirical cases 
of presidentialism. In order to properly address the study’s research questions, the second 
chapter presented the theoretical frameworks on the role of presidentialiam and discussed 
its application to the Afghanistan case. The chapter also reviewed some of the major 
arguments on presidentialism which were criticizing this system for some of its flaws 
inherent in the institutional structure of the system, causing executive-legislative conflict, 
institutional paralysis and breakdown of presidential governments. The chapter followed 
with the explanation of the Afghanistan case and showed how there was great potential 
for the emergence of executive-legislative conflict as well as institutional paralysis 
because of the divided characteristic of President Hamid Karzai’s government, which was 
heavily influenced by the dominant fragmented multi-party system. The third chapter of 
this dissertation laid out a methodological framework for the study to be properly 
conducted. The chapter introduced the concerned dependent and independent variables 
and explained how these variables will be measured. The legislators’ support of 
president’s legislative initiatives was treated as the dependent variable and cabinet 
coalition building was measured as the main independent variable. Two other variables, 
crisis situation (Taliban military threat), and the distribution of material benefits to the 
MPs were treated as less significant variables.  
 
The main two chapters of this dissertation, four and five, tested as well as measured the 
study’s variables. Through the analysis of relevant legislative data, chapter five 
demonstrated that: in the absence of the president’s partisan power, the strategy of 
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distributing cabinet portfolios to the different political groups was an effective tool, 
enabling President Hamid Karzai to insure a majority or close to majority’s support 
within the assembly through those political groups which had sufficient legislative weight. 
The impact of such strategy on the legislators’ support of president’s legislative 
initiatives was measured by an analysis of President Hamid Karzai’s coalitional cabinet, 
before and after the changes in its composition. The analysis revealed that, while 
President Hamid Karzai continued with the same composition of his cabinet which came 
out of a coalitional agreement with the major political groups, the rate of his passed 
legislative initiatives was high, and he faced no defeats within the legislature. However, 
when he brought some changes in the composition of his cabinet, dismissing some of the 
ministers who belonged to an influential political group, there was a decrease in the 
legislators’ support for him and he faced some defeats within the assembly. 
 
Also the study demonstrated that President Hamid Karzai was, perhaps surprisingly, 
benefiting from the country’s uncertain military situation caused by the Taliban’s 
constant insurgencies. For a large body of MPs, who were the Taliban’s former political 
rivals, such as members of the former Northern Alliance group, or those who were 
ideologically opposed to the Taliban, such as female MPs and advocators of western 
ideologies, the existence of the Taliban military threat became an incentive mechanism 
for these legislators to support President Hamid Karzai’s government. The result of the 
analyzed data showed that while President Hamid Karza was pursuing a strict anti-
Taliban policy, there was an absolute majority’s support for him within the legislature, to 
the extent that all of his legislative initiatives successfully passed and become law. 
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However, once he changed his policies towards the Taliban and started secret 
negotiations with them, there was a reaction within the legislature: the legislators’ 
support of the president’s legislative initiatives decreased and some of the president’s 
legislative initiatives faced defeat.  
 
The last part of chapter five discussed the distribution of patronage as another factor 
which had an impact on executive-legislative relations in general and particularly on the 
legislators’ behavior. The distribution of patronage, which included the distribution of 
material benefits to the MPs and the use of pork-barrel spending, was an effective 
instrument enabling President Hamid Karzai to garner legislators’ support within the 
Wolesi Jirga. This instrument, in particular, was used to deal with the independent MPs, 
who did not have affiliation with the political parties.                       
 
As findings, several points can be drawn from this study. First of all, through the analysis 
of Afghanistan’s case of presidential system, the study offered a detailed explanation of 
how a presidential system survived in a divided society without facing those problems 
associated with presidentialism. In this regard, the study of Afghanistan’s case of 
presidential government challenges Linz’s [1990] hypothesis that the separation of power 
and a fixed electoral calendar, which are characteristics of presidentialism, generate 
executive-legislative conflict and institutional paralysis. On the other hand, it   
contributes to the further confirmation of Shugart and Mainwaring’s [1997] hypothesis 
that presidential regimes are not always associated with instability and executive-
legislative conflict; rather, based on the party system and the president’s constitutional as 
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well as partisan powers, the functioning as well as performance of presidential regimes 
vary. Obviously, the case of Afghanistan’s first presidential government proved the 
existence of such a variation in the functioning of presidential systems. Despite a strong 
potential for conflict between the executive and legislative as well as institutional 
paralysis within the President Hamid Karzai government, his government survived 
without seriously facing these problems.  
 
Perhaps a more important point that can be drawn from this study is that the case of 
Afghanistan’s presidential government suggests that factors other than constitutional or 
partisan power of a president can also be helpful for presidents facing divided 
government and lacking a consistent majority within the assembly. As it was quite 
observable through the analysis of Afghanistan’s first democratically elected presidential 
government, President Hamid Karzai did not have his own political party that he could 
rely on for support within the assembly, and on the other hand, the legislature had the 
power of overriding the president’s legislative decree as well as vetoing bills through its 
two-thirds majority vote. However, according to the data presented in this study, still 
President Hamid Karzai was successful in the law-making process, initiated more bills 
than the assembly did, and most of his initiatives successfully passed in the assembly and 
became law. As this study illustrated, the reason behind the success of President Hamid 
Karzai was his use of the strategies of cabinet coalition building, distribution of patronage, 
and the Taliban military threat. 
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Appendix 1 
 
List of Interviewed MPs from the Lower House/ Wolesi Jirga 
   
 
 Name of the MPs     Representative from/ Province 
 
1. Mr. Mohammad Noor Akbari     Daikondi 
 (Kabul, Wolesi Jirga 2009/8 / 10)  
 
2. Miss. Fawzia   Kofi       Badakhshan 
 (Kabul, Wolesi Jirga 2009/ 8/20) 
 
3. Ms. Shokria   Barikzai      Kabul 
  (Kabul, Wolesi Jirga 2009/ 9/1) 
 
4. Mr. Ahmad   Behzad      Heart 
   (Kabul, Wolesi Jirga 2009/9/3) 
 
5. Mr. Rahman   Ughlli      Faryab  
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 (Kabul, Wolesi Jirga 2009/8/14) 
 
6. Mr. Alimi   Balkhi       Kabul 
  (Kabul, Wolesi Jirga 2009/8/16) 
 
7. Mr. Sarwar   Jawadi      Bamyan 
  (Kabul, Wolesi Jirga 2009/8/15) 
 
8. Mr. Najib   Kabully       Kabul 
  (Kabul, Wolesi Jirga 2009/9/4) 
 
9. Mr. Ahmad   Joyenda      Kabul 
 (Kabul, Wolesi Jirga 2009/ 7/13) 
 
10. Mr. Dawood   Sultanzoie      Ghazni 
(Kabul, Wolesi Jirga, 2009/ 9/10) 
 
